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ABSTRACT
Statistical Method for Extracting Radiation-Induced
Multi-Cell Upsets and Anomalies
in SRAM-Based FPGAs
Juan Andrés Pérez Celis
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, BYU
Doctor of Philosophy
FPGAs are susceptible to radiation-induced effects that change the data in the configuration
memory. These effects can cause the malfunction of the system. Triple modular redundancy has
extensively been used to improve the circuit’s cross-section. However, TMR has shown to be
particularly susceptible to radiation effects that affect more than one memory cell such as Multiple
Cell Upsets (MCU) or micro-Single Event Functional Interrupts (micro-SEFI).
This work describes a statistical technique to extract Multi-Cell Upset (MCU) and microSEFI events from raw radiation upset data. The technique uses Poisson statistics to identify patterns
in the data. The most common patterns are selected using Poisson statistics. The selected patterns
are used to reconstruct MCU events. The results show the distribution of MCU, micro-SEFis, and
single-bit upsets for several radiation tests. Additionally, the results show the MCU distribution
based on the number of bits affected by the event.
This work details the process of reconstructing MCU data and also the process to use these
data during a fault injection campaign. The results show that by using MCU fault injection it is
possible to replicate failures seen in the radiation test and even induce more failures than seen in
the radiation test. This shows the importance of extracting MCUs from radiation data and use them
to evaluate TMR-protected designs.

Keywords: FPGA, radiation effects, multiple-cell upset, micro-SEFI, SEU, SEE, Poisson statistics
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CHAPTER 1.

INTRODUCTION

Electronic circuits are susceptible to radiation-induced effects known as single event effects
(SEEs) [11]. These events occur when a high-energy particle strikes and transfers some of its
energy to elements of the circuit. This energy is commonly transferred in the form of current.
The induced currents from this energy transfer can be sufficient to cause a change in the state of a
memory element [12]. This change of state is known as a single event upset (SEU) and can cause
a variety of problems in electronic circuits.
SRAM-based electronic devices are susceptible to SEUs that can change the values stored
within SRAM cells leading to data corruption. In an SRAM-based FPGA, the configuration memory (CRAM) is implemented as SRAM memory and contains the device configuration information: routing, interconnections, and logic functions. Ionizing particles in these SRAM, like in other
SRAM-based devices, can affect more than one memory cell in the CRAM array [13].
An upset in more than one memory cell could happen for two reasons. First, an energized
particle may spread the charge over more than one memory cell causing them to upset. This event
is known as a multi-cell upset (MCU). During radiation testing, these MCUs have been regularly
observed [13]. Second, an upset may happen in a memory cell that controls the functionality of
other elements within the FPGA, causing the other related bits to change their value (such as a reset
signal). This event are called in this work micro-single event functional interrupt (micro-SEFI).
The most used technique to mitigate SEUs in the configuration memory of an FPGA consists of replicating a design and adding a majority voter to select the correct output. At the same
time, a recovery mechanism corrects any errors read within the configuration memory of the FPGA.
This technique is known as Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR) with scrubbing. While TMR coupled with scrubbing is an effective approach for mitigating against single-event upsets, this approach may not tolerate MCUs in the CRAM. The reason is that TMR is guaranteed to work as
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long as only one module of the three is in a fail state, and MCUs can cause failures in two states at
a time.
The effect of MCUs is important to study because MCUs can overcome the protection from
TMR. Researchers have shown that MCUs are a significant contributor to the failures presented in
FPGAs protected with TMR. Authors in [14] estimated that 50% to 81% of the failures in their
TMR designs were attributed to MCUs. With MCUs becoming a major cause of TMR failure, it
is important to better understand these events and how they impact FPGA designs using TMR. By
better understanding MCU events and their impact on FPGAs and TMR, improved MCU mitigation techniques can be developed.
A method to identify MCU events is necessary to further understand the effect MCUs have
on FPGA designs. The first step is to isolate MCUs that occur in FPGAs in radiation environments.
These environments where an FPGA is exposed to radiation include the neutrons in planet Earth,
protons and cosmic rays in space, and energized particles in high-energy physics environments.
After that, it is necessary to devise a method to artificially introduce these events into the
configuration memory of FPGAs. This can be done through a modification of the data within the
configuration memory of the FPGA. Modifying the configuration memory will allow the evaluation
of the impact that MCUs have on the device under test.
The work in this dissertation addresses both problems by developing a method to extract
MCUs from radiation data and inject them into FPGAs. This work solves this problem by introducing a statistical method based on Poisson statistics that can be used on radiation data to identify
MCUs and other anomalies in the data. The resulting data is then used to perform more accurate
fault injection tests, where MCU are emulated by injecting bits based on the MCU shapes, sizes,
and frequencies.
The statistical method was used on radiation data for Xilinx FPGAs from three different
families: 7-series, Ultrascale, and Ultrascale+. At least one device of each family was exposed to
radiation from a neutron, proton, or heavy ion beam. MCUs were extracted from the CRAM and
BRAM upsets of these devices. Additionally, MCUs were injected in a sequential design to assess
different variants of TMR techniques.
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1.1

Contributions
This dissertation provides the following unique contributions to this work:
• Automatic extraction of Multiple Cell Upsets from radiation test data. This work describes a method that automatically generates likely MCU events using Poisson statistics to
identify MCU shapes. The results of the method include the distribution of the different
MCUs for three Xilinx families.
• Identification of anomalies for their study. This work allows the isolation of anomalies
such as micro-SEFIs and MCUs for an in-depth examination. Once such an event is found,
using the proposed method the event could be replicated so that the effect could be studied in
a particular design. Since the method is not dependent on the data set, these reproducible results allow engineers to develop strategies to mitigate the effects of micro-SEFIs and MCUs.
• Method for artificially injecting MCUs and micro-SEFIs into FPGA designs using fault
injection. This work uses the identified MCU and anomaly data to inject the event into the
configuration memory. This allows a fault injection campaign that helps to take into account
the impact of MCUs on a design.
• An estimation of the sensitivity of a design to MCUs and micro-SEFIs. The results of
this work provide the distribution of anomalies for different Xilinx FPGAs.
The contributions of this work have been published in six peer-reviewed articles that are

summarized in Appendix A.

1.2

Structure
This dissertation is divided into 8 Chapters to allow a better understanding of the work

performed. The rest of the document is organized as follows:
Chapter 2 introduces basic radiation effects that affect in different manners electronic circuits,
with emphasis on the effects on FPGAs.
Chapter 3: delves into details of multi-cell upsets in electronic devices to get a deeper understanding.
3

Chapter 4: discusses radiation testing and the best practices to get MCU data from a test.
Chapter 5: details the method developed in this dissertation for the extraction of anomalies from
radiation test data.
Chapter 6: shows the MCU experimental results of radiating three different FPGA families with
a neutron beam.
Chapter 7: describes fault injection and its use to identify additional micro-SEFIs.
Chapter 8: describes an enhanced fault injection method for SRAM-based FPGAs that injects
multiple-cell upsets within the configuration memory of an FPGA based on multiple-cell
upset information extracted with the method shown in Chapter 5.
Chapter 9: presents the conclusions of the work and provides a guide for future work.
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CHAPTER 2.

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

This chapter gathers background information regarding FPGA architectures, the effect that
radiation has on them, and how to protect FPGA designs against radiation to understand the statistical method used in this dissertation to extract radiation-induced MCUs in FPGAs. Section
2.1 explains the radiation environment and its effect on FPGAs. Section 2.1 describes the FPGAs Architecture with particular emphasis on the 7-series of Xilinx. Section 2.3 shows several
fault mitigation techniques that are currently used on FPGAs. Section 2.4 touches on some of the
testing options available to assess the response of FPGA designs to radiation.

2.1

Radiation Overview
Radiation environments are harsh environments that can significantly impact the function-

ality of electronic devices. It is important to review radiation sources that can affect these devices
to understand the different effects that radiation has on FPGAs.

2.1.1

Radiation Environment
The space consists of several environments that may interact with electronic devices induc-

ing undesirable effects. There are nine specific environments in the space, considering the natural
environments and the man-made environments [15].
The ionizing radiation environment is of particular interest in this work because it encompasses the sources of particles affecting electronic devices and causing undesired effects in FPGAs
memory elements, such as bit-flips. The particles of concern are electrons, protons, photons, alpha
particles, and heavy ions [16].
High-energy particles can be classified into two primary categories: photons and charged
particles [2]. Photon particles have zero rest mass and are electrically neutral. They interact with
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target atoms producing energetic free electrons. The charged particles interact with the silicon
atoms causing excitation and ionization of atomic electrons.
Figure 2.1 illustrates the charged particles sources in space. The primary sources for ionizing effects are protons and electrons trapped in the Van Allen belts. Also, heavy ions are trapped in
the Earth’s magnetosphere. Other sources are Galactic Cosmic Rays (GCR) from outside the solar
system, terrestrial neutrons from GCRs, and heavy ions and protons from solar flares [17].

Figure 2.1: Charged particles in space environment [2].

2.1.2

Radiation Effects on FPGAs
Radiation effects in electronic devices can be modeled using mathematical and physical

approaches (refer to Section C). However, these approaches are too complicated to model the
practical effects that radiation has on electronic devices. Instead of dealing with the phenomena
through mathematical models, it is possible to use a fault model to identify the effects of radiation
in an operating device. The model defines the difference between a faulty system and the behavior
of a correct system.
6

Fault Model
According to NASA Fault Management Handbook [18] an abnormal state of a system
includes three terms: fault, error, and failure. A fault is usually understood as the cause of an
error and an error as the cause of a failure. In the standard ISO 26262, a fault is defined as
an “abnormal condition that can cause an element or an item to fail.” The error is defined as
the “discrepancy between a computed, observed, or measured value or condition, and the true,
specified, or theoretically correct value or condition.” Finally, failure is defined as the “termination
of the ability of an element, to perform a function as required.”
Consider a bit flip that occurs in a register. If that bit flip does not affect the operation of the
device, then it is a fault. Suppose that the fault propagates, and a computation is performed with
the faulty value. Then, the fault caused an error in the device. If the result with errors is output or
used, i.e., the value with errors is not masked or corrected before operating with it, the device will
present a failure.
Although the failure is always caused by a fault, a fault does not necessarily lead to a failure.
In an electronic device, such a fault could be a flipped bit in a memory address or a register. In
any case, only if the faulty resource is used in the design the associated fault will finally lead to a
failure.
The fault models induced by radiation can be classified into two categories:
• Single Event Effects (SEE) and
• Total Ionization Dose (TID).
The difference between having a SEE or accumulating TID is based on the Linear Energy
Transfer (LET) of the particle and the threshold of the material. If the LET of the particle is less
than the threshold LET of the material, the particle will only accumulate charge. On the other
hand, if the LET of the particle is greater than the LET threshold, then the particle produces a SEE.
The LET is the energy transferred to the material in the path due to secondary particles
emitted during the interaction [3]. The threshold refers to the energy needed in the device to
present an effect in the operation of itself.
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Single Event Effects
The SEEs are induced by a single particle that hits the device in a particular spot. These
particles generate a funneling effect depicted in Figure 2.2 Different SEEs are produced depending
on where the particle struck, the moment when it hit, and the energy of the particle. The fact that
a particle hits a device does not necessarily mean that a SEE will be produced.

Figure 2.2: Funneling effect in CMOS transistor [3].

The SEEs may be transient faults that affect the device until the device is reset, these SEEs
are known as soft errors. Soft errors include Single Event Upset (SEU), Single Event Transients
(SET), Multi-Cell Upsets (MCU), Single Event Functional Interrupts (SEFIs), and localized SEFIs
known as micro-SEFIs. If the fault is permanent it damages the device and it is known as a hard
error.
SEEs on FPGA devices should be considered prior to utilizing an FPGA in radiation environments. Researchers have thoroughly studied the SEE on FPGAs [19]. The most relevant effects
on FPGAs are the following:
• Single-event upsets (SEU): A single-event upset is a change of a bit in a memory element.
SEUs are caused by ionizing radiation. The effect of radiation on memory elements may
8

change the voltage levels on a memory cell, causing a bit flip. The modified value will be
preserved on the memory element; the original value will be lost. This SEE does not cause
permanent damage.
• Multi-Cell Upsets (MCU): A particular case of SEU where one particle causes multiple bits
to upset.
• Single-event transient (SET): A single-event transient is a temporary voltage increase due to
radiation. The effects of SETs are transient glitches that propagate through an architecture.
A SET becomes an SEU when a glitch is stored in flip-flops or latches. SETs do not cause
permanent damage to the device.
• Single-event functional interrupt (SEFI): A single event functional interrupt (SEFI) refers
to a SEE that modifies the functionality of the device. Usually, SEFIs are presented as
changes in the internal states of control registers. The probability of having a SEFI is small
although SEFIs can be presented in several situations, such as device reset, power-on reset,
initiation of operating mode, lockup, sleep mode, to name a few. The main reason for a
low probability is that the area devoted to these structures is very small. SEFIs do not cause
permanent damage to the device.
• Single-event latchup (SEL): Single-event latchup is a destructive effect caused by charged
particles that activate a parasitic silicon-controlled rectifier (SCR). The impedance of the
path decreases causing an increased current flow between power and ground. The current
is, in many cases, large enough to cause permanent damage to the device. Due to their
destructive nature, all devices considered for space applications should be tested for SELs.
Once an SEL is presented, the device’s power supply must be interrupted to stop the latchup
from destroying the device.
This dissertation focuses on the study of soft errors. Particularly, this work focuses on
single particles that cause bit-flips in the memory elements of SRAM FPGAs. More details on the
effects of SEE in FPGAs and how to cope with them are presented in Section 2.3.
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Total Ionizing Dose
The amount of radiation dose that a device can tolerate before failing to meet tolerance
specifications is called total ionizing dose (TID). [20] The TID is the effect of accumulating charge
in the device. If the exposition time increases or the flux increases, the device accumulates more
charge.
The TID in space applications and avionics is mainly caused by the effect of protons and
electrons present in the Van Allen belt , and by the constant interaction of secondary particles
with the device itself [2]. The TID accumulation produces several effects like wearing out of the
device, slow response of transistors, more power consumption, increases on the sensibility to other
SEEs. TID is formally the accumulated energy transferred to a material per mass unit due to the
interaction with particles. TID is measured in [rad], an acronym for radiation absorbed dose. 1
rad is equal to 0.1[ joule
kg ].

2.2

FPGA Architecture
The Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) is a programmable logic device (PLD) that

allows in-field reprogrammability. The first FPGAs were introduced back in the 1980s. Nowadays,
there are three main types of configuration cells in FPGAs: antifuse, flash, and Static Random Access Memory (SRAM). These three main technologies have different advantages and disadvantages
that make each of them suitable for different applications.
Antifuse FPGAs consist of a one-time programmable electrical configuration memory. The
desired logic is obtained by burning off contact points in the circuit. They are non-volatile. Antifuse FPGAs were preferred in the 1980s for the stability of their configuration memory, and are
still being used in critical applications.
Flash FPGAs are nonvolatile and reconfigurable devices. The configuration memory is
stored in flash memory. These FPGAs are less power-hungry and are also tolerant of some radiation
effects. Even though Flash FPGAs like IGLOO2 from microchip can pack more than 150,000 logic
elements, their size is only comparable to a small size SRAM FPGA like the Artix 7 200T from
Xilinx that has over 350,000 logic elements [21].
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SRAM-based FPGAs are reconfigurable devices with the logic behavior and routing stored
into an SRAM memory [5]. The technology is volatile, and the program should be loaded after
powering the FPGA up. SRAM FPGAs have the disadvantages of consuming more power and
being more sensitive to high-energy radiation than antifuse and flash FPGAs. However, the advantages of being faster, denser, and able to be reprogrammed as many times as needed outweigh the
disadvantages in many cases.
The characteristics of FPGAs have made the three types of FPGAs valuable for space
applications because of their high density, high performance, reduced development cost, and reprogrammability. From the three types, SRAM-based FPGAs excel because of the possibility of
being reprogrammed by the user on-demand, their high performance, and their high density. This
work will refer to SRAM-based FPGAs as just FPGAs unless otherwise stated.
This work uses different SRAM devices from three families of FPGAs manufactured by
Xilinx Inc. The devices were chosen because they are recent models that are actively used in space
applications and other radiation environments. Also, they have been partially characterized in
radiation environments. This is important because the goal of the statistical technique is to identify
radiation-induced MCUs in FPGAs.

2.2.1

Xilinx FPGA Architecture
The discussion on this subsection revolves around the architecture of the three selected

Xilinx families. To avoid redundant information, the subsections describe the architecture of a
Kintex 7 device, which is a Xilinx FPGA from the 7-series. However, this discussion applies to
the other two families explored in this dissertation: Ultrascale and Ultrascale+.
The 7 series is based on an SRAM memory cell that is used to store the configuration
data. In Figure 2.3 an SRAM cell to store a bit of information with six transistors is depicted.
The state adopted by the cell can be 1 or 0. When a 0 is present at the switch, the transistor
creates a connection between two hard-wired segments; in the other case, the transistor exhibits a
high resistance, opening the path between the segments. The bit stored in the SRAM cell may be
flipped by radiation effects inside the circuitry [22], [23].
Xilinx FPGAs consist of Configurable Logic Blocks (CLBs) surrounded by Input/Output
Blocks (IOBs), all interconnected by routing resources. Each CLB has a set of Look Up Tables
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Figure 2.3: CMOS SRAM cell.

(LUT), multiplexors, and flip flops. The CLBs are tiled across an FPGA with routing wires between
them, as shown in Figure 2.4.
A LUT is a logic structure capable of implementing a given Boolean function. The LUTs on
the Kintex 7 are LUT-6, [21] which can implement any 6-input 1-output boolean function, 5-input
2-output boolean functions, and so on. The CLBs provide the functional elements, such as LUTs
and FFs, to build logic while the IOBs act as the interface between the package pins and the CLBs.
The CLBs are interconnected by the General Routing Matrix (GRM) located at the intersections
of routing channels. FPGAs can also have embedded Block of RAM (BRAM), hard processors,
Phase Lock Loops (PLLs), hard Digital Signal Processing Slices, and other components that vary
depending on the FPGA family and manufacturer.
Figure 2.5 shows a general representation of the Xilinx FPGA architecture [5]. This abstracted representation shows the most important elements of an FPGA. It contains a zoomed-in
representation of a CLB with the details of a slice and the General Routing Matrix (GRM) that
connects the elements in all the FPGA. Also, it shows the embedded memory that is known as
Block of RAM (BRAM).

2.2.2

Reconfiguration
The Kintex 7 can be reconfigured as other SRAM FPGAs. The process may be performed

after powering up the device. This process consists of loading a bitstream or configuration file into
the configuration memory of the FPGA. Once the bitstream is loaded and the FPGA is working,
the user can keep track of the configuration memory content by performing an operation called
12

Figure 2.4: Tiled CLBs [4].

readback. A readback operation reads the content of the configuration memory and can be done
through SelectMAP, ICAPE2, and JTAG interfaces [24]. For critical missions, it is important to
check the content of the configuration memory periodically as it will be changed when exposed to
radiation environments.
FPGAs can also be reconfigured without interrupting the functionality in a process known
as partial reconfiguration (PR) [4]. In PR a whole bitstream can be loaded or one can prefer to load
a smaller portion. PR allows modifying a subset of a design in an active FPGA. A small bitstream
should be loaded into a set of addresses of the configuration memory to perform a successful PR.
Figure 2.6 shows the concept behind PR, where a portion of the FPGA can be used to
implement several functions. The portion labeled ’A’ represents the reconfigurable logic. A1.bit,
A2.bit, A3.bit, and A4.bit, represent the different bitstreams that can be loaded into the FPGA.
As mentioned previously, most resources are controlled by several volatile memory cells
[25]. These cells are known as the configuration memory (CRAM). The configuration memory
defines the behavior of LUT boolean functions, routing signals, voltage standards for IOBs, and
multiplexor connections.
However, the content and state of resources like Flip-Flops and BRAMS cannot be read if
the resources are being used. Moreover, when doing a partial reconfiguration, the state of these
elements will not be changed. If an error exists in the content of a BRAM, it will stay there even

13

Figure 2.5: Xilinx FPGA Layout [5].

Figure 2.6: Partial reconfiguration functionality [6].

after reconfiguration. A full power-on cycle and reconfiguration of the device will restore the
content to the initial state.
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In Xilinx FPGAs, the configuration memory is divided into frames. Frames are the smallest
addressable unit of the configuration memory. A frame has a set of words with 32-bit words [4].
The configuration operations should be performed over one or more frames. The words per frame
in the 7-series are 101. Figure 2.7 shows the configuration memory frames over an abstracted
FPGA layout for Xilinx FPGAs.

Figure 2.7: Frames over FPGA layout [7].

It is worth to point out that even though frames can be mapped to a region in the FPGA [6],
Xilinx does not provide the mapping between the bits in the bitstream and the actual resource that
they control. Despite the fact, performing a readback in the configuration memory and modifying
corrupted bits is enough to cope with radiation effects on FPGAs.

2.3

FPGA Fault Mitigation Techniques
Several Fault Mitigation Techniques (FMTs) for FPGAs have been developed [26], [27],

[28], [29]. The main goal is to increase the reliability of the FPGA by tolerating SEU induced
faults. Two common FMT are fault-masking or by fault recovery [26].
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One form of fault maksing is the use of hardware redundancy. Spatial redundancy is commonly implemented, these techniques include: Duplication With Compare (DWC) [30] , Triple
Modular Redundancy (TMR) [31] and Reduced Precision Redundancy (RPR) [32] are fairly recognized techniques. In spatial redundancy a module is replicated to reduce the probability of having
faults in all the replicated modules. Information redundancy consists of Error Detection and Correction (EDAC) algorithms and Algorithm-Based Fault Tolerance(ABFT). These techniques are
based on additional information stored in memories to detect or correct if a fault happens within a
define memory range. The effects of SEEs on information redundancy techniques are explored in
more detail on Section 3.3.2.
In addition to failure masking techniques, failure recovery techniques can be used to increase the reliability. One of the most common techniques is scrubbing [27], [26]. Scrubbing consists of refreshing the configuration memory to correct bit-flips. Fault recovery techniques can also
be applied to BRAMs or other memories in FPGAs by following the same idea of scrubbing [33].
The internal components of an FPGA all have different vulnerabilities to SEEs. In Xilinx
FPGAs, the configuration memory and the BRAMs are the most affected [34], [35]. However,
FPGAs can also fail in other elements. Table 2.1 shows techniques to cope with SEEs in the
different elements of an FPGA.
Table 2.1: FMTs for elements in SRAM FPGAs [1].
FPGA element

Problem caused by SEE
Corrupts circuit’s operation,
bus conflicts, modification of
the logic
Transient error propagation
in the logic

Partial or full reconfiguration

BRAMs

Corruption of stored data

TMR, Error Detection and
Correction Codes (EDAC)

IOBs

False outputs to other devices
or false inputs

TMR

Configuration Memory
CLBs
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Possible mitigation

System level redundancy

2.4

Overview of FPGA Radiation Testing Methods
To identify the sensitive modules within an SRAM FPGA design, several tests may be

conducted: life testing, accelerated radiation test, fault injection, and analytical techniques. These
tests assess in different ways the functionality of the device in a radiation environment.
Life testing consists of placing the system under the natural radioactive environment. This
test has several clear drawbacks. The drawbacks are the reduced amount of data that may be
acquired, the long duration of the test, the high cost of placing the system under the needed environment, and the enormous quantity of devices needed to provide an acceptable sample.
In accelerated radiation testing, the system is exposed to a particle flux several orders of
magnitude greater than in the space [5]. Statistics from years of radiation exposure can be collected
in just a few minutes. Moreover, with this test, different parameters can be found for the complete
characterization of the device under test. The drawbacks of this test are the expensive facilities and
the need to perform this test with each new design on an FPGA device.
Accelerated radiation testing can be performed with different particles: heavy-ion, proton,
and neutrons. This last type, the neutron beam, has a lower flux that will not gather statistics as
great as with another beam. However, they have proven useful to estimate the dynamic crosssection and to verify the functionality of architecture to upsets. The effect caused by neutrons is
physically different from the effect of charged particles, but the manifestation of the effect is the
same: a bit flip.
Faults can also be injected artificially into an FPGA using fault injection. Fault injection
tests can be done as an additional feature for debugging. The basic concept of this technique is to
insert a fault and observe how it propagates through the system. The drawbacks are for large-scale
systems where inserting faults all over the systems, results in a prohibitive time for the experiment
to perform correctly.
In this dissertation, two of the four tests are used: radiation testing and fault injection.
Radiation testing was performed mostly using neutron particles, however, proton and heavy-ion
tests were also conducted. More details on radiation testing can be found in Chapter 4. Likewise,
Chapter 4 provides a detailed discussion on fault injection.

17

CHAPTER 3.

MULTIPLE CELL UPSETS

The goal of this chapter is to describe the details of multi-cell upsets in electronic devices.
The chapter starts with the physical and logical view of an SRAM memory to illustrate the differences between these two views. Then, it shows why MCUs happen in electronic devices. The
chapter continues with a discussion of previous work to extract, understand, and mitigate the effect
of MCUs. Finally, the chapter ends by describing the impact that MCUs have on FPGA devices.

3.1

MCUs in SRAM Memory Cells
This section introduces the physical layout of a typical six transistor (6T) SRAM memory

cells. This is used to illustrate how MCUs can occur in the sensitive regions of an array of 6T
SRAM cells. Then, the section shows different mechanisms that cause multi-cell upsets in memory
devices. The section ends with a formal definition of MCU based on the concepts described in the
whole section.

3.1.1

Physical Layout of a 6T SRAM Cell
Figure 3.1 shows the schematic of a typical 6T SRAM cell. The cell consists of two PMOS

load transistors (PL0, PL1), NMOS driver transistors (ND0, ND1), and two access transistors
(NA0, NA1). It also includes a wordline (WL) and two bitlines (BL, BLN) that are horizontally
and vertically connected among cells. This array is essentially a cross-coupled inverter to hold the
state.
A physical layout of this 6T SRAM cell is shown in Figure 3.2. The metal layer has been
removed for clarity purposes. In this example, there are three layers, the diffusion layer in green,
the poly layer in orange, and the well layers in white separated with dashed lines. The layout
has the PMOS transistors centered in the cell, hence this is an NMOS-PMOS-NMOS layout of a
typical 6T SRAM cell.
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Figure 3.1: Schematic of a typical 6-transistor SRAM cell from [8].

Figure 3.2: Layout of a typical 6-transistor SRAM cell from [8].

Two sensitive nodes have been identified in a typical 6T SRAM cell: a low-state (L) in
PMOS transistor and a high-state (H) in NMOS transistor [8]. These nodes are shown in Figure 3.3.
Researchers have observed that the NMOS has a 4× larger SEU cross-section than a PMOS [36].

Figure 3.3: Sensitive nodes in the layout of a 6-transistor SRAM cell from [8].

Figure 3.4 shows an array of four 6T SRAM cells using the general NMOS-PMOS-NMOS
layout. The red regions are the H NMOS regions discussed in the previous paragraph. In this
general layout, the sensitive NMOS nodes are found in the same P-well regions. As seen in this
layout, the 6T SRAM cells have sensitive nodes close to each other, which increases the chances
that a single event causes multiple cells to upset [37].
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Figure 3.4: Array of four 6T SRAM cells [8].

3.1.2

MCU Mechanisms in Memory Cells
Three mechanisms cause MCUs in memory devices [9]. These are a incident charged

particle, a particle crossing through the sensitive regions of two adjacent cells, and a chain reaction
that has reaction products that pass through two sensitive regions. All of these mechanisms have
been observed in DRAM and SRAM memories.
A single incident particle has been shown to cause MCUs in memory cells [38]. Researchers concluded that as the spacing decreased between junctions one would expect that at
some point the particle track will be large enough to span across the gap between the two junctions
with enough energy to upset both cells. Figure 3.5 shows a representation of such phenomenon.

Figure 3.5: Particle crossing two sensitive regions of physical adjacent cells from [9].

The second mechanism is a particle crossing through the sensitive regions of two adjacent
cells at some angle, as shown in Figure 3.6. MCUs caused by such mechanism have been found
in [39], [40], and [41]. These events are dominated by the prompt and funnel charge deposited by
the particle that strikes both cells.

20

Figure 3.6: Single incident particle crossing two sensitive regions of physical adjacent cells from
[9].

Finally, the third mechanism that causes MCUs is the shower-like chain reaction that can
hit multiple sensitive regions of different memory cells shown in Figure 3.7. The range of the
by-product particles is less than a few micrometers and the LETs are below 15 MeV-cm2/mg. The
separation distance must be in the order of a few micrometers and the circuitry must have a low
critical charge for both cells to upset [9].

Figure 3.7: Particle causing a shower-like effect of other charged particles that cross two sensitive
regions of physical adjacent cells from [9].

These three mechanisms suggest that as transistors shrink, the possibility of a single particle upsetting multiple cells increases. Researchers have found an increase in MCUs with the
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technology advancements [42]. Part of the increase in MCUs is a result of the particle interacting
with adjacent transistors that are physically close [43]. In this case, a charged particle is more
likely to generate a charge in an area that will affect more than one transistor. Other characteristics
that contribute to the increase in MCUs are the fabrication process [44], [45].

3.1.3

Logical View
The discussion so far has been centered on the physical view of the device to understand

how more than one cell can be affected by the same event; however, it is worth defining the logical
view of memory to understand the impact MCUs have on the reliability of memory devices. Moreover, it is crucial to understand that adjacency in the physical view does not represent adjacency in
the logical view.
The logical view of memory is a representation based on the logical structure of the memory. Memories are generally organized as a two dimensional array of cells with words and mutliple
bits per word. For example, Figure 3.8 shows the logical representation of a 32-bit memory organized in four 8-bit words, i.e., the end-user view of the memory. Assuming that each of these
words can be logically addressed, this memory will have one address for each word, for a total of
four addresses. Although, this representation shows that bit 0 in word A and bit 1 in word A are
adjacent, in the physical view these two bits can be farther away, as shown in Figure 3.9.

Figure 3.8: Logical view of a 32-bit memory with each word in different color.

Nowadays memories resemble Figure 3.9 because they use a technique to physically separate bits that are adjacent in the logical view. This technique is called interleaving. For this
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Figure 3.9: Logical view of a 32-bit memory with 4-bit interleaving. Each word is shown in
different color. The number in each box corresponds to the logical bit number.

particular case, the memory is a 4-bit interleaved memory. The implications of interleaving on the
reliability of a memory device will be discussed in the next section.
For this dissertation, special emphasis has been given to SRAM memory cells. The main
reason is that the FPGAs used throughout this research are SRAM-based FPGAs. However, it is
worth mentioning that MCUs are not exclusive to SRAM technology. Researchers have found that
MCUs affect DRAM too [46], [47], [48]. Even though the physical layout of DRAM memory cells
is different from SRAM cells, an array of DRAM cells also have sensitive regions close enough to
present MCUs [49], [50], [41].

3.1.4

MCU definition
Multi-cell upsets are formally defined as an event caused by a single particle that changes

the state of multiple memory cells as the high energy particle moves through the substrate.. As
illustrated with the three mechanisms previously discussed, an MCU is caused by a single particle
that physically interacts with multiple memory cells or a single particle that causes by-product
particles that interact with multiple cells. In any case, an MCU can always be attributed to a single
particle.

3.2

MCUs in FPGAs
This section describes MCUs that have been seen in the memory elements of the FPGAs.

The section starts by discussing the different memory elements affected in SRAM FPGAs. Then,
it continues by describing the difference between MCU, MBU, Coincident SBU, and micro-SEFIs.
Finally, it ends with a discussion on the impact that MCU has on FPGAs.
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Multiple cell upsets have been observed across several generations of SRAM FPGAs [51].
Table 3.1 shows the percentage of events that were MCUs from heavy-ion tests at 20MeV of seven
different generations of Xilinx FPGAs. From the Virtex-1 released back in 1999 to the generation
released in 2016, all FPGAs have experienced MCUs in their CRAM. BRAMs have also presented
MCUs in their content [13].
Table 3.1: Percentage of MCUs in CRAM across several families of Xilinx FPGAs.
Device
Technology
MCU

Virtex I
180nm
5%

Virtex II
150nm
8%

Virtex 4
90nm
9%

Virtex 5
65nm
23%

Kintex 7
28nm
25%

Ultrascale +
16nm
8%

This work gives a stronger emphasis to MCUs in CRAM than in other memory elements.
However, BRAM data is also discussed to an extent. This special emphasis comes from two main
reasons. The first reason is that in SRAM FPGAs, the configuration memory is the largest memory
element followed by the BRAMs. The ratio of CRAM to BRAM bits varies with each device
from around 4:1 to about 6:1 CRAM to BRAM bits [4]. The second reason has to do with their
sensitivity to radiation. Xilinx reliability reports [52] show that CRAM has a slightly higher crosssection on devices released before the Ultrascale family, e.g. the 7 series devices. With higher bit
count and higher cross-section, CRAM becomes the focus of this MCU work.
BRAM MCUs are also interesting to analyze. One reason is that they have an Error Correction and Detection Code that could be compromised in the presence of MCUs. Another reason is
that the reliability report [52] shows an increase in the relative cross section of BRAM and CRAM
in the Ultrascale and Ultrascale devices. Earlier families like the 7-series have a slightly higher
CRAM than the BRAM cross-section. The Ultrascale family has a BRAM that is short of 2× more
susceptible than the CRAM, while the BRAM in the Ultrascale+ family jumps to over 3× more
susceptible than the CRAM.

3.2.1

Differences Between MCUs and Similar Radiation-Induced Events in FPGAs
Several types of radiation-induced events that affect CRAM and BRAM have been dis-

cussed in section 2.1.2. Some of these soft errors can become hard to distinguish from an MCU
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event. To illustrate the difference that exists between these events, it is preferable to look at these
events from a logical view.
This section uses the logical representation to show the difference between MCUs and other
similar events. The section starts with an MCU on the CRAM FPGA memory. Then, it shows and
defines the different radiation-induced events that can resemble an MCU. Although this section
draws the events on CRAM, BRAM is also susceptible to these events, as discussed at the end of
the section.
Figure 3.10 shows an MCU in orange in the logical representation that consists of a frame
address and a bit number in the configuration memory of an SRAM-based FPGA. Notice that in
the logical view the three bits of the MCU are not all adjacent. This illustrates that the logical view
can not be translated into the physical layout of the device.

Figure 3.10: Example of a 3-bit MCU in the logical view of a CRAM.

To further understand MCUs and the differences with other types of radiation-induced
events, Figure 3.11 shows the logical view of an FPGA CRAM with a single cell upset and with
four different radiation-induced events that affect multiple cells in FPGAs. These events are defined as follows:
1. Single Cell Upset (SCU) - A single particle causing a single cell to upset (represented by the
black cell labeled ‘1’ in Figure 3.11). These upsets involve one and only one cell and have
no impact on other cells in the device. Most of the upsets in a radiation test are SCUs.
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Figure 3.11: Examples of the types of upsets experienced in an SRAM FPGA. The black cell is an
SCU, the blue cells show an MCU, the two red cells are a CSEU, and the green cells represent a
micro-SEFI.

2. Multiple Cell Upset (MCU) - A single particle causing two or more physically-adjacent
cells to upset. An example of an MCU event is shown by the blue cells labeled ‘2’ in Figure
3.11. This example demonstrates that the bits associated with this single-event MCU are not
necessarily logically adjacent.
3. Multiple Bit Upset (MBU) - Two particles causing logically-adjacent cells to upset. In
MBUs, the upset bits occur in the same logical word (represented by the red cell labeled
’3’ in Figure 3.11). These events are of special interest when protecting with Error Detection and Correction Codes. The impact of these events in FPGA is further detailed in the
next section.
4. Micro Single Event Functional Interrupt (micro-SEFI) - Is an SEU within a single bit that
indirectly causes multiple related cells to change their value. These events are of special
interest in FPGAs because in FPGAs bits in CRAM are tied to a resource, an upset in a
bit that controls a set/reset signal of a multi-bit register will result in many cells with an
upset on them. An example of a micro-SEFI that affects the whole content of frame A is
represented by the eight green cells labeled ‘’4’ in Figure 3.11. These events generally affect
a few hundred bits or even thousands of bits. However, smaller micro-SEFI events have been
observed in SRAM FPGAs, like a micro-SEFI that affects the full LUT content [53].
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5. Coincident SEU (CSEU) - Occur when two independent SCUs are found in logically adjacent or nearby locations (represented by the red cells labeled ‘3’ in Figure 3.11). While
CSEUs are rare, the probability of occurrence increases significantly as the number of upset
cells in the radiation test data increases.
CSEUs and micro-SEFIs makes the goal of extracting MCUs more challenging. The presence of micro-SEFIs within the radiation data will skew the data by introducing false upset patterns.
Failing to identify and disregard micro-SEFIs could lead to inaccurate identification of MCUs.
More details on micro-SEFIs and how to extract them is given in Chapter 5.
The presence of CSEUs is another type of event that negatively affects the quality of the
MCU extraction. This event does not happen very often with the neutron radiation on Earth. This
type of event is a concern in accelerated radiation testing where years of radiation events can be
simulated in minutes. With the high number of particles interacting with the FPGA every second,
it is important to account for possible CSEU when extracting MCUs. A more in-depth discussion
of CSEUs and radiation testing is presented in Chapter 4.

3.3

Impact of MCUs in FPGA designs
This section discusses the impact that MCUs have on a design due to their presence in

BRAM and CRAM. This discussion includes the implications of the presence of MCUs and techniques to protect the correct operation of the device.

3.3.1

Impact of MCUs in FPGA BRAM
For the current discussion of MCUs in BRAM, BRAMs can be seen as a dense memory

array. The effect that an MCU has in BRAM is the same as with any SRAM memory array: several
bits of the data will change their value.
The data in the BRAMs can be protected against MCUs and SCUs. For BRAMs, the protection techniques used are information redundancy techniques commonly applied in other memories. One of the most popular techniques consists on applying error detection and correction codes
(EDAC) [54], [55]. The most basic detection code consists of adding a parity bit, to a group of bits,
to ensure that the number of set bits is even or odd. Figure 3.12 shows the detection of an SEU in
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an 8-bit even-parity word with the LSB as the parity bit. The addition of more than just one parity
bit enables EDAC codes to detect more than one error in a word and even correct them.

Figure 3.12: 7-bit word with a parity bit experiences an upset. Since the number of set bits has
changed from an even number (4) to an odd number, the word can successfully be classified as
faulty.

Consider the example in Figure 3.13 where a 2-bit MCU flips the content of two cells.
The parity check will not detect the errors on the word and this erroneous word will propagate
throughout the circuit, potentially leading to a failure.

Figure 3.13: 7-bit word experienced two upsets due to an MCU. Since the even parity of set bits
still true, the faulty word will propagate through the system.

These behaviors have been observed in SRAM FPGAs making MCUs a concern for error
correction codes (ECC) [56]. Researchers in [57] have found MCUs that affect multiple bits in a
BRAM word. Around 1.5% of the events affect 2 bits in the same word, while 0.03% affect more
than two bits. This analysis was done on an FPGA with 4-bit interleaving on its BRAM and with
a SECDED code that detects double-bit errors and correct single-bit errors. For this FPGA, 0.03%
of MCUs will potentially be uncorrectable and undetectable errors.
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3.3.2

Impact of MCUs in FPGA CRAM
To understand the impact that MCUs have on the operation of an FPGA design, it is im-

portant to discuss the protection that a design can have against MCUs. This protection comes from
two different fault-tolerant approaches. The first approach is using information redundancy, while
the second approach uses hardware redundancy.

Impact of MCUs against Information Redundancy
Information redundancy is also used to protect the content of the CRAM in FPGAs. This is
done with internal circuitry that manufacturers may add to their devices. Generally, this circuitry
performs ECC and CRC. An example is the Soft Error Mitigation IP (SEM-IP).
The SEM-IP is a core that can be used in Xilinx devices to monitor, detect, and correct a
subset of MCUs. It can detect anytime a frame has two upsets or a pair number of upsets in the
frame. It can always correct one upset per frame. However, it can only correct two upsets in the
frame if they are logically adjacent.
Researchers in [57] have estimated that the SEM IP is capable of detecting and correcting
94% to 99% of upsets with an experiment conducted with an Artix-7 device. This paper has a
high estimate because they assume that all 2-bit faults in a frame would be corrected - which is not
the case on the SEM-IP. However, they show that the effectiveness of the SEM IP decreases as the
number of MCUs increases.
A more realistic estimate for the same device that considers the adjacency constraints imposed by the CRC in the SEM-IP is presented in Table 3.2. MCUs account for 27.7% of the number
of events. Slightly more than 5% of the MCUs are uncorrectable errors for the SEM-IP. The main
contributor to these errors is MCUs with two not-adjacent upsets in the frame.

Impact of MCUs against Hardware Redundancy
MCUs in the CRAM of an FPGA have a particular effect that cannot be dealt with using
ECC because the impact is different from that in other memory devices. In FPGAs, the CRAM is
controlling the operations that are performed in the FPGA. A change in the CRAM data could stop
the correct operation of the FPGA design. More details are discussed in Section 2.1.2.
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Table 3.2: Breakdown of MCU events in an Artix-7 device affecting the functionality of the SEMIP
Events
SCU
MCU
MCU 2 adjacent upsets in frame
MCU 2 not adjacent upsets in frame
MCU 3 upsets in frame

41 753
30 186 (72.3%)
11 567 (27.7%)
1788 (4.3%)
1891 (4.5%)
369 (0.9%)

The effects of MCU in CRAM can be mitigated using hardware redundancy techniques.
This means that the effect of MCUs in the design could be mitigated. This allows the system to
tolerate faults and continue its correct operation. There are several different techniques involving
redundancy that can be applied in FPGAs (refer to Section 2.3 with the most popular being TMR).
The most widely used technique in FPGAs to tolerate SEUs from high energy radiation
is Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR) with an extra layer of protection that comes from scrubbing. However, even this popular technique has been reported to be vulnerable to MCUs [14]
because TMR can only guarantee the correct operation if only one module fails. With the presence of MCUs, there is a probability that two domains get affected by the MCU at the same time,
overcoming the scrubbing protection too, as shown in Figure 3.14.

Figure 3.14: Typical implementation of TMR. A particle caused an MCU affecting module 0 and
1 at the same time. The error is not masked and the TMR implementation fails.
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TMR techniques have become more sophisticated and robust to SCU in recent years. Researchers have developed more sophisticated algorithms to perform TMR on FPGAs that decrease
the susceptibility to SCUs. Different TMR implementations have been developed based on tuning
some parameters such as the separation between modules, the most vulnerable nodes that need
replication, partitioning the design into several TMR-ed sections, and other sophisticated techniques.
As TMR implementations become more resilient to SCU the role MCUs have in breaking
TMR becomes more apparent. Researchers have shown that MCUs are a significant contributor to
the failures exhibited by FPGAs protected with TMR. Authors in [14] showed that 50% to 81%
of failures in their TMR designs are attributed to MCUs. The percentage of failures due to MCUs
increase with the robustness of the techniques under test. If MCUs are a major cause of TMR
failure, it is important to better understand these events so that improved mitigation techniques can
be developed.

3.4

Previous Work on MCU Extraction
This section discusses previous efforts on the extraction of MCU data from memory el-

ements, including FPGAs. There are two main categories for these works. The first category
includes the projects that used the physical layout to extract the data. The second category includes the works that did not have access to the full physical layout of the device and had to come
up with statistical methods to extract MCU data.
The first efforts in FPGAs were using the physical layout of the device [58], [59]. The
physical layout can only be obtained upon reverse engineering or with access to proprietary information. The need for physical layout information limits the possibility of extracting MCUs from
the majority of devices using these approaches.
Other techniques fall into the second category and have explored extracting MCU data
with minimal information on the physical layout. In [60], authors present a mathematical model to
estimate the impact on the reliability of MCUs in memory elements. The model identifies MCUs
with an analytical model based on the distribution of arrivals of grouped events in memory. The
main takeaway of this work is not in the identification of MCUs but rather in the estimation of
the failure rate of a memory exposed to MCUs. The authors show that the failure rate can be
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approximated using the existing results for SEUs by adjusting the arrival time. This, in essence,
models the accumulation of bits in memory.
Another attempt to extract MCUs is presented in [61]. Authors extracted MCUs for a
Spartan 3 device by performing a radiation test at very low levels of flux, to decrease the probability
of CSEUs. However, with the low flux, only a handful of MCUs was detected after the experiments.
With the low flux, their method can extract MCUs accurately, but the number of MCUs that can be
extracted is low.
Another set of works that use minimal physical layout information are presented in [51]
and [56]. In [51], MCUs are extracted from heavy-ion data for an FPGA device. Their technique
aims to build a physically-adjacent model based on the logical distances of upsets. The more times
upsets have the same logical distance, the more likely the upset cells are physically adjacent. In
[56], the authors used the same idea of generating a physically adjacent model. The only difference
is that they decided to perform xor operations between upsets in the same scrub cycle, instead of
subtraction as used in [51], i. e., instead of true distance they measured the hamming distance.

3.4.1

Improvements over Previous MCU Identification Techniques
The statistical method in this dissertation improves the current techniques in four main

areas. First, it applies statistical methods to identify the patterns that generate MCUs. It is of
extreme importance to have an established statistical method capable of choosing the most common
offsets. This method could then be used for any device and different radiation sources.
Second, this work performs data filtering to reduce the data contamination, allowing for
more accurate identification of MCUs. None of the works considered the effects of micro-SEFIs
when extracting MCUs. It is important to filter contamination as this could drastically change the
MCU reconstruction patterns as discussed in Section 6.3.1.
Third, this work aims to identify localized Single Event Functional Interrupts (micro-SEFI),
where a single particle affects a particular element in the FPGA causing several bits to change their
content. This is done using Poisson statistics and also using fault injection. Previous works do not
make any distinction between MCUs and micro-SEFIs.
Fourth, this work supports the ability to extract shapes over a relatively large search space.
It looks at the whole device space to avoid assumptions of the physical layout. Previous works
32

have considered that physically adjacent bits can only be apart by 32 logic positions, which may
not be the case.
The statistical method to identify MCUs uses radiation test data as input. These data are
processed to identify MCU events caused by the radiation. The next chapter introduces radiation
testing and discusses the best practices to get meaningful data that can be used for MCU extraction.
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CHAPTER 4.

FPGA RADIATION TESTING

MCUs and anomalies in FPGAs can be identified using a reliability assessment method
known as radiation testing. During a radiation test, the FPGA is irradiated with energized particles
to cause SEE. The upsets that occur with this irradation are collected and analyzed. This work uses
the collected input data to statistically extract radiation-induced MCUs and anomalies.
This chapter starts with a discussion on radiation testing in electronic devices. This discussion includes core concepts needed to understand radiation testing methods. The chapter continues
with a description of the setup used in radiation testing. Then, the chapter discusses the into modifications on the normal radiation testing flow to test for MCUs.

4.1

Radiation Testing
Before deploying an FPGA design in a radiation environment it is necessary to test the

device response for radiation-induced effects. Radiation testing is used to measure the “crosssection” or probability that a particle will cause a specific effect in the device. Many different
types of tests can be conducted each giving different information [62], [63].
The probability of detecting a SEE under normal terrestrial radiation conditions is low,
requiring many years to collect meaningful data in a conventional ground environment . Radiation testing provides accelerated results of the sensitivity of an FPGA design to a radiation source
to ensure correct execution in the application field. Radiation testing provides accelerated rates
of exposure. For example, an hour in the neutron beam of Los Alamos National Science Center (LANSCE) will provide the same fluence of neutron in one hundred years at the altitude of
airplanes [10].
In addition to the accelerated rate of exposure, radiation testing has a second benefit. This
second benefit is that it simulates the actual effects experienced in the deployed environment.
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Exposing the device to the same environment it will be deployed into informs the designers of the
possible radiation effects and the robustness of the design to these effects.

4.1.1

Radiation Sources for Testing
To perform radiation testing, a charged beam of high-energy radiation is generated through

different means, and the device under test (DUT) is placed into the “flight path” of the charged
particles. These radiation particles interact with the DUT and can deposit enough energy to induce
SEEs [64]. These effects can then be studied in this pseudo-controlled environment [65].
Radiation testing can be performed with different radiation sources. There are three are
radiation sources that are used the most: heavy-ion, proton, and neutron. These three radiation
sources can generate SEUs in FPGAs, however, the mechanism is different. Heavy ions produce
SEUs due to direct ionization, while protons and neutrons create reaction products via nuclear
reaction, with the reaction products producing the ionization [66].
Researchers might be interested in irradiating with one, two, or the three different sources,
depending on their mission, to characterize a device or design. For example, in space applications,
protons from solar events and heavy ions from galactic cosmic rays are the most important particles
in the environment. For terrestrial environments, it is especially important to understand how
neutrons impact FPGAs because they are the main source of radiation-induced upsets on Earth.
The radiation source most used for this work is the neutron beam at Los Alamos Neutron
Science Center (LANSCE). LANSCE uses a linearly accelerated proton beam striking a tungsten
spallation target to generate neutrons for neutron radiation testing [67]. All experiments were
performed on the 30◦ flight paths which have a neutron spectrum similar to the neutron spectrum
in the atmosphere caused by cosmic rays, matching the JEDEC standard for spallation neutron
beams [65].
The neutron flux provided by the beam at LANSCE is about one million times greater than
those generated by cosmic rays as seen depicted in Figure 4.1. This provides accelerated rates of
exposure for the experiments where one hour in the beam is equivalent to one hundred years at the
altitudes of airplanes [10], [68].
The second type of radiation used to test FPGAs is heavy ion beams. These are particularly interesting for radiation environments such as the space environment because it is possible to
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Figure 4.1: Comparison of neutron spectrum from LANSCE ICE house vs Earth neutron spectrum
from Cosmis rays [10].

choose from different ions that yield different energy levels. Furthermore, in a space mission, a
simulation of the satellite orbit can tell the energy levels to which the satellite will be exposed.
The third radiation source in this work is protons. Proton beam is of interest to space
missions due to the high existence of protons in the space environment. Likewise, researchers use
proton beams due to the low upset rate and the ease of flux adjustment [62]. This means researchers
can achieve the desired upset rate for their experiments.

4.1.2

Radiation Cross-Section
Radiation testing can estimate the sensitivity of the DUT in a metric called cross-section.

The cross-section is the hypothetical area where if a particle passes through it would result in an
event [69]. The failure cross-section would be the number of failures divided by the fluence in
particles
cm2

of the radiation beam and has units of cm2 . In general, an event cross-section would be the

number of events divided by the fluence of the beam, as shown in Equation 4.1
σ=

Nevents
.
f luence

These events can be failures, SCU, MCUs, micro-SEFIs, or any other event of interest.
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(4.1)

Additionally, the cross-section is related to the radiation source used during the test. For
example, the SEU neutron cross-section of a device refers to the number of SEUs seen divided by
the fluence of a neutron beam.
Static and dynamic testing are two types of tests that can be performed in FPGAs with
radiation testing [70], [71]. These tests yield the static and dynamic cross-section of a device.
Static testing involves quantifying upsets in the CRAM without monitoring clocks, inputs, and
outputs of a fully configured device during irradiation. Dynamic testing requires observation of a
functional design under irradiation to determine the sensitivity of the combinatorial logic and the
sequential logic to SEUs and SETs [72].

4.2

Radiation Testing Setup and Procedure
This section shows the key components needed to extract upset information from FPGA

devices. Since most of the data for this work was gathered in a neutron beam, a description of the
setup used for the LANSCE facility is described. This setup illustrates the components and the
method followed for successfully testing an FPGA device.
The primary goal in radiation testing for this work is to capture single-event upsets from the
CRAM and BRAM caused by the high-energy radiation. Several key components are needed in
an experiment to achieve this goal. First, a board and the ability to mount board at the appropriate
place in a radiation beam. Second, the ability to read the CRAM memory and determine which
bits have been upset. Third, the ability to fix upsets. Fourth, the ability to read other parameters of
the FPGA like temperature. Fifth, a computer running a script to implement the procedure for the
test. Finally, the ability to turn on and off the experiment and the radiation source. Each of these
components is discussed in this section.
The neutron setup is generally comprised of several elements to position, monitor, operate,
and radiate the Device Under Test (DUT) while gathering meaningful statistics. The stage positions
the device in the required location where the beam crosses the DUT at the desired angle. This angle
is generally 90o to the beam path in neutron tests. Figure 4.2 shows a stage that uses three clamps
to hold firmly an FPGA device in the beam path.
A system capable of reading the CRAM and BRAM memory content is used to identify
radiation-induced upsets. This work used the JTAG Configuration Manager (JCM) developed
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Figure 4.2: XCKU040 FPGA board supported and aligned with the neutron beam at LANSCE.

at BYU [73]. The JCM performs continuous reads and scrubs of the FPGA’s memory content,
logging the location of every detected upset. The JCM supports JTAG on several Xilinx families.
Additionally, it supports a faster protocol for a specific FPGA device. This protocol is known
as SelectMAP and it was used in this work in one of the devices. The JCM is also in charge of
reconfiguring the device in case an upset event cannot be fixed.
Other parameters can be interesting to monitor such as the temperature and power supplies.
This can be done with external devices that report to a main computer. It is interesting to monitor
these paraeters because the DUT can malfunction due to high-operation temperatures instead of
failing due to the radiation itself. Power supplies can also be monitored, this gives additional
information when the DUT fails. For example, latch-up events can be identified from monitoring
the power supplies [74].
A computer is used to operate the DUT. This computer runs scripts that coordinate the
monitoring and execution of the test. The computer will send signals to the power supplies to turn
on/off the device; to the JCM to start/stop the configuration, scrubbing, and data gathering; and
other instruments like the temperature sensor to gather data. All of this is performed to orchestrate
the test.
To start the DUT irradiation it is necessary to follow the procedure that each beam facility
has. This procedure is extensively explained when arriving at the facility. All the facilities will
give training to the members of the team to operate the beam. The procedure generally consists of
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safety guidelines to ensure none is exposed to the beam when this is on. More details of testing at
LANSCE are described in [68].

4.3

Radiation Testing for Extracting MCU
To perform MCU identification it is necessary to collect the logical address of all bits

that are upset. These data are the input to the proposed statistical technique described in this
dissertation.
It is a good practice to fix the upsets in the CRAM each time a readback is performed
during a radiation test. As discussed previously, this technique is called scrubbing. In the case of
radiation testing, scrubbing allows the design to return to working conditions most of the time, but
sometimes the design will return to a faulty state.
In this work, scrubbing is used to identify the logical addresses of all bits that upset. Regardless of whether the design is in a faulty state or not, the data gathered will be useful for this
work if and only if the upsets in the CRAM are fixed, i.e., they do not appear again in the following
readback.
BRAM data can be gathered without the need of scrubbing the data. A more straightforward approach is to keep a golden copy of the BRAM content and update it when an upset occurs.
This will avoid reporting duplicated upsets in the BRAM.
For MCU data extraction it is necessary to perform continuous readings of the memory
content. Then, the process continues with a comparison of those readings with a golden copy. This
comparison yields the logical location of the upset memory cells. Finally, the upset cells need to be
fixed on the memory or updated in the golden copy to avoid counting duplicates before repeating
the same process. The time it takes to perform a readback, a comparison with the golden copy, and
the correction of the upsets is known as a scrub cycle. During the radiation test, the scrub cycles
occur continuously providing snapshots of the memory contents at discrete time intervals.
In FPGA radiation testing, it is assumed that all memory locations have the same probability of being upset. The data gathered in the test will have several scrub cycles with an average
number of upsets that will follow a probability distribution. For radiation testing in SRAM FPGAs,
the number of upsets in each scrub cycle follows a Poisson distribution, as discussed in [64].

39

The Poisson distribution is a discrete probability distribution that expresses the probability
of a given number of events occurring in a fixed interval of time or space. In radiation testing,
upsets occur during scrub cycles. In Poisson distributions these events occur with a known constant
mean rate. Also, Poisson the events occur independently of the time since the last event.
In radiation testing, Poisson distribution is an appropriate model if the following assumptions are true:
1. The number of upsets that occur in a time interval k take values 0, 1, 2, . . .
2. The occurrence of one upset does not affect the probability that a second upset will occur.
3. The average upset rate is independent of any occurrences.
4. Upsets do not occur simultaneously, but rather occur in short sub-intervals.
The first assumption holds in radiation testing because the number of upsets that occur in a
scrub cycle is discrete taking values of 0, 1, 2, . . . . This means that there are no fractional upsets in
scrub cycles. The second assumption holds for single-cell upsets, but in radiation testing there are
MCUs that go against this assumption. However, MCU have a much lower occurrence than singlecell upsets. For purpose of simplification, in radiation tests it is assumed that the probability of one
upset does not affect the probability that another upset occurs. The third assumption is justified
because in radiation testing upsets are assumed to occur with a constant mean rate, although in
reality there is a slight variation that can be assumed to be low enough to be simplified to a constant
rate. Lastly, the fourth assumption is true for single-cell upsets but MCUs break this assumption.
To simplify the analysis, in radiation testing these multi-bit events are treated as independent upsets
occurring in a short-time interval.
The probability that a scrub cycle has x upsets follows the Poisson distribution shown in
equation 4.2:
P(x) =

λ x e−λ
x!

(4.2)

where x is an integer of the number of events, P(x) is the probability of exactly x events happening,
and λ is the mean of the distribution or expected number of upsets. For example, if the average
number of upsets per scrub cycle is 2, the probability that a scrub cycle will have 2 upsets is 0.27.
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Figure 4.3: Report of upsets in a memory readback of a Xilinx device during neutron irradiation.

The statistical method uses Poisson statistics to identify MCU events in the data. For this,
the data needs to contain the logical location of the upsets for each memory reading. The logical
location can be specified with two or three dimensions. For example, Xilinx devices group bits
into words, and words into frames. An example of a valid upset report from radiation testing that
would work for the identification of anomalies is shown in Figure 4.3. Details on the data output
in a radiation test can be found on Section 5.1.
The report in Figure 4.3 also contains timestamps. These timestamps are needed because
part of the statistical analysis to extract MCUs and other anomalies is based on the number of
expected SCUs in a scrub cycle. If the number of reported upsets is some threshold higher than the
number of expected upsets in that cycle, then, it is possible that an anomaly happened during that
cycle.
The data needed to extract MCUs and other anomalies from radiation-test data can be
gathered from static or dynamic testing. There are no visible advantages from performing a static
test instead of a dynamic test other than it might be more simple to generate an empty design
for a static test. However, if a dynamic test is being run, it is possible to perform the readback
of the memories to extract the necessary information to execute the statistical technique of this
dissertation.
During radiation testing, it is important to ensure that the fewest number of upsets happen
during each scrub cycle [75]. As the number of upsets per scrub cycle increases the probability
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of having CSEUs also increases. Conversely, the probability of a CSEU decreases as the size of
the configuration memory increases. The probability of a CSEU occurring in a scrub cycle can be
computed based on the average number of upsets per scrub cycle, the size of the memory array,
and the size of the CSEU. The expression to compute the probability of a 2-bit CSEU is:
 
2
u
P(CSEU2 ) =
×
;
2
N −1

(4.3)

where P(CSEU2 ) is the probability of at least one given CSEU of size two, N is the number of
cells in the memory array which could be BRAM or CRAM, and u is the average number of upsets
per scrub cycle.
For example, the probability of having a given size-2 CSEU (P(CSEU2 )) on the CRAM of
the Artix-7 200t device is 3.4 × 10−8 ; assuming that on average the device upset two times every
non-empty scrub cycle which lasts 0.25s, and considering that the Artix-7 200t has 59,145,600
bits

1

on its configuration memory (CRAM). The P(CSEU2 ) can be seen as the probability that

u upsets will generate a size-2 CSEU in a grid with N cells. The same approach can be used to
compute the probability of size-2 CSEU for BRAM upsets.
During radiation tests, it is important to plan on gathering enough data to allow the proposed statistical method to work adequately to extract MCUs. From the experiments performed, is
preferable that the data contains at least 5% of the total CRAM or BRAM bits. This favors repetition of upset pairs that are used to identify MCUs. An example of insufficient data is presented in
Section 6.3.2.
Performing neutron radiation tests or proton radiation tests with low fluence makes it easier
to identify MCUs. This is because the low fluence will induce a low number of upsets per scrub
cycle. Since upsets caused by a single particle cannot span across scrub cycles, all the upsets of
an MCU will be contained in a scrub cycle. Hence, having a low number of upsets per scrub cycle
helps the identification of MCUs. More details of identifying the MCUs and the statistics behind
this technique are described in Chapter 5.

1 The

number of CRAM bits was obtained by performing a readback of each type-0 and type-1 frame. A total of
18308 type 0 frames were identified. Out of those, eight were dummy frames. Finally, the remaining number of frames
(18300) was multiplied by 3232, which is the number of bits per frame.
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CHAPTER 5.

MCU EXTRACTION FROM RADIATION TEST DATA

The previous chapter showed that radiation testing can be used to capture upsets in FPGA
devices. From a radiation test, it is possible to extract the logical location of upsets in the FPGA.
These data can be used to apply the statistical method described in this chapter to extract MCUs
and other events for an FPGA.
This chapter details the method for the extraction of MCUs and micro-SEFIs from radiation
test data, from data acquisition to their reconstruction, with emphasis on the extraction of MCUs.
Such a method relies on Poisson statistics to filter the contamination of the data and to select
patterns as candidates for the reconstruction. The chapter ends by detailing the reconstruction
process.
The method proposed in this work

1

to extract MCUs from FPGA radiation-test data in-

volves identifying common patterns on the positional difference of upsets in the logical view. These
common patterns are then combined to identify statistically likely MCUs from radiation test data.
This method consists of the five steps shown in Figure 5.1. The first step, data gathering,
consists of exposing the FPGA to a radiation source while periodically acquiring upset data. In the
second step, data filtering, contamination on the data from outliers in the form of micro-SEFIs is
removed. The third step, computation of offsets, calculates the positional difference between each
pair of upsets and generates a histogram of offsets. The fourth step, selection of most common
offsets, employs statistics to select the offsets that are used on the MCU reconstruction. The fifth
and final step, MCU reconstruction, consists of grouping bits into MCUs based on the offsets
selected in the previous step.
Each step of this method is described in more detail within the remainder of this chapter.
1 The

software implementation of this method can be found in: https://github.com/byuccl/MCU_Analysis.
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Figure 5.1: Flow diagram showing the steps involved in the statistical technique to extract MCUs
from radiation-test data.

5.1

Data Collection
The first step of the statistical method is to collect a set of scrub cycles and the upsets

in each of these from static or dynamic designs. The collected data should contain the logical
location where upsets occur (refer to Section 3.1.3). Likewise, it is required for the data to be
broken down into scrub cycles. Another requirement, is to read the upset data as fast as possible to
avoid contamination. More details on radiation tests for MCUs are shown in Section 4.3.
Table 5.1 shows an example of three scrubcycles from the data collected from a neutron
test performed at Los Alamos Neutron Science Center (LANSCE) in December 2018 for the
XC7A200T FPGA. The full data contains the logical location of about 65,000 upsets in 41,069
scrub cycles. The data is comprised of the frame number, the word, the bit, the current scrub cycle,
and an ID for each upset within a scrub cycle.
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Each line of this table lists each CRAM upset that occurred in scrub cycles 13-15 of the
test. Each CRAM upset in the table is described with the logical location of the upset including the
frame, word, and bit. For this example, scrub cycle #13 had three CRAM upsets, cycle #14 had
one upset, and cycle #15 had two upsets.
Since an MCU event cannot span across multiple scrub cycles because an MCU is caused
by a single particle that upsets the content of more than one memory cell, it is possible to treat a
scrub cycle as the atomic unit of the next step. Hence, each scrub cycle is independently analyzed
for the presence of MCUs [76].
Table 5.1: Upset information from LANSCE neutron testing.
Scrub cycle
13
13
13
14
15
15

5.2

Upset ID
1
2
3
1
1
2

Frame
0x0C8F36
0x1040693
0x11807C4
0x11409A0
0x1140067
0x1180B3C

Word
5
44
67
10
61
70

Bit
16
23
22
16
25
15

Data Filtering
As discussed in Section 3.2.1, in the presence of a micro-SEFI, readbacks can show hun-

dred or thousand of upsets per cycle. These scrub cycles could have some information on MCUs
but that information is contaminated and should be disregarded in the remainder of the MCU extraction process (refer to Section 6.3.1 for more details and a real example of data contamination).
The process of filtering data is needed to remove contamination from the data that is caused by
micro-SEFIs.
The method to filter micro-SEFIs is to remove scrub cycles that are statistically unlikely
to occur. These scrub cycles that are removed likely have micro-SEFIs in them that affect from
a hundred to thousand of upsets. These scrub cycles may also have MCUs, however, it is more
important to remove the contamination. To perform the identification of these contaminated cycles,
this works relies on Poisson statistics.
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This filtering method starts with the computation of the number of upsets per scrub cycle.
This number is then used as the mean of a Poisson distributed process. This is done because the
number of upsets in each scrub cycle follows a Poisson distribution [64]. The Poisson distribution
shows the probability of having x number of upsets on a scrub cycle. This distribution can be used
to find highly unlikely scrub cycles in the data log.
Two approaches can be used to compute the number of expected upsets per scrub cycle.
First, this number can be extracted by multiplying the number of upsets per second by the seconds
in a scrub cycle. Second, this number can be computed by performing a Poisson fit over the
distribution of the number of upsets per scrub cycle seen in the radiation log. The mean of the
Poisson fit represents the expected number of upsets per scrub cycle.
Consider the following example where an FPGA experiences a mean of λ = 2 upsets per
scrub cycle. For this mean, the probabilities for x events happening in a scrub cycle are shown in
Table 5.2. The scrub cycles in this example have a 0.135 probability that they contain no upsets.
Conversely, the probability that of having 10 upsets in a scrub cycle is 4 × 10−5 . The probability of
having more than 10 upsets is just 8 × 10−5 . This is important because it gives statistical support to
identify micro SEFIs. After all, scrub cycles with a large number of upsets caused by independent
particles are unlikely to occur during a radiation test.
Table 5.2: Probability of events in a scrub cycle with λ = 2.
x
0
1
2
3
4
10
> 10

P(x)
0.135
0.270
0.270
0.180
0.090
0.00004
0.000008

To filter the scrub cycles from the radiation test data that include micro-SEFIs, it is necessary to analyze all scrub cycles within the radiation test to find those cycles that have more upsets
than would be expected from the Poisson distribution. Such anomalous cycles may suggest the
presence of a micro-SEFI. This analysis starts by computing a cut-off value, which is defined as k,
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on the Poisson distribution for the number of upsets per scrub cycle. This value separates the scrub
cycles of the distribution into two sets. The lower set, also referred to as the filtered set, contains
all scrub cycles where the number of upsets is less than k. These scrub cycles are those that are
statistically likely and represent conventional upsets. The upper set contains all scrub cycles where
the number of upsets is greater than or equal to k. This upper set contains scrub cycles with a
highly unlikely number of upsets and is a candidate for micro-SEFI events.
This parameter, k, is computed using a Poisson fit over the distribution of the number of
upsets per scrub cycle. The parameter λ of the Poisson fit is then used to calculate P(x), the
probability that x upsets occur in a scrub cycle. For this paper, the cut-off value of x is where
P(x) ≤ 10−10 . This probability value means that the chances that an event after the cut-off occurs
are less than 10−10 . The resulting value is chosen as the cut-off, and scrub cycles are flagged
accordingly.
To choose this value for other data sets, researchers can follow the same procedure and
choose a probability value based on the uncertainty they are willing to tolerate. To check if the
chosen value is suitable for the data set, the cut-off value should split the distribution into two sets.
The lower or filtered set must have a Poisson distribution that follows the Poisson fit since the
number of upsets in each scrub cycle follows a Poisson distribution [64]. The upper set will have
some events that may appear intermittently in the histogram.
For example, in Figure 5.2, the upper set has a Poisson distribution that contains almost
all numbers of upsets per scrub cycle. After the cut-off, events of some sizes are presented while
events of other sizes are missing. The extensive use of this technique by the Configurable Computer
Lab (CCL) at Brigham Young University (BYU) for several data sets shows this to be an indicator
that separates micro-SEFIs from other events in the distribution.
Figure 5.2 shows a histogram of scrub cycle upset data collected from a single neutron
radiation test for a Xilinx Artix 7-series device. The data contains 65,935 upsets divided into
41,069 scrub cycles. The x-axis represents the number of upsets detected in a single scrub cycle.
The y-axis shows the number of scrub cycles containing the given number of upsets for the duration
of the beam test. Figure 5.2 contains a zoomed-in section focusing on the number of scrub cycles
containing eight or more upsets. The red line in the figure represents the cut-off value, k, calculated
with the process previously described with a lambda of 1.57. The cut-off value for these data is
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15, meaning the remaining scrub cycles with more than 15 upsets are flagged as micro-SEFIs. In
this example, four scrub cycles were filtered.

Figure 5.2: Histogram showing the frequency of the number of upsets across all scrub cycles in a
neutron test for the XC7A200T device.

Using the calculation of k, it is possible to identify scrub cycles corresponding to outliers,
i.e., scrub cycles with an improbable number of upsets. If the data is not filtered, micro-SEFIs could
hide the actual patterns of MCUs. Using this filtering process, the results reported in Chapter 5
show that the XCZU9EG device experienced several micro-SEFIs in the configuration memory
that would have disrupted the identification of MCUs (refer to Section 6.3.1 for more details of the
data contamination in the XCZU9EG device).

5.3

Computation of Pair Offsets
The next step in the extraction process is to compute the pair offsets. This step starts once

the data contains only the scrub cycles after the contamination has been filtered. The goal of this
step is to identify common offset pairs between the upsets in the same scrub cycle.
The offset computation begins with the translation of the upset information into a twodimensional coordinate system. The proposed coordinate system consists of (x, y), where x is the
frame number in decimal and y is bit offset in the frame which is computed as 32 × word + bit.
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Then, the method proceeds with the computation of the pair offsets within each scrub cycle.
A pair offset is the difference in the logical position of a pair of upsets. The computation is achieved
by iterating through each upset and computing the positional difference, i.e., offset, for each pair
of upsets within the same scrub cycle. Computing all the pairs in a scrub cycle is n(n − 1). The
complexity of this computation is O(n2 ).
Table 5.3 shows an example with three scrub cycles with one, two, and three upsets in each
cycle. The first column shows the count of upsets within a scrub cycle, while the second column
shows the ID of each scrub cycle. The third, fourth, and fifth columns show the logical location of
the upsets in the frame, word, and bit, respectively. The (x, y) column has the position of the upset
captured in the two-dimensional coordinate system. Finally, the last column shows the offsets
between each pair of upsets in the scrub cycle.
The number of offsets for each upset in a scrub cycle will be equal to the number of upsets
in the cycle minus one. For example, the scrub cycle with ID 3 in Table 5.3 has three upsets in the
cycle, meaning that each upset will have two pair offsets. To avoid duplicates, this technique only
considers pair offsets with a positive x value.
Table 5.3: Upset information extracted from LANSCE neutron testing for the XCKU040.
Upset
1
1
2
1
2
3

Scrub ID
1
2
2
3
3
3

Frame
0x044823
0x060980
0x060981
0x0429A9
0x0429AA
0x0429AB

Word
115
25
25
115
115
115

Bit
22
23
22
31
31
31

(x,y)
(280611,3702)
(395648,823)
(395649,822)
(272809,3711)
(272810,3711)
(272811,3711)

Offsets
NA
(1,-1)
(-1,1)
(1,0) (2,0)
(1,0) (-1,0)
(-1,0) (-2,0)

After computing the offsets and choosing only the ones with a positive x, all the pair offsets
from every scrub cycle are collected. This can be done in a histogram, a heatmap, or a frequency
table that keeps the count of the repetitions of each pair offset within all the data. The resulting
frequency table is used in the next step.
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5.4

Selection of Most Common Offsets
The next step in this process is to select the most common offsets. After computing the

offsets and choosing only the ones with a positive x, all the pair offsets from every scrub cycle are
collected. This can be done in a histogram, a heatmap, or a frequency table that keeps the count of
the repetitions of each pair offset within all the data.
Given the frequency table that contains the count for each pair of offsets. The goal of this
step is to find these offset pairs that are most common to use in identifying MCUs. These offsets
are known as the most common offsets (MCO).
The idea behind identifying the MCOs is that independent upset pairs in a scrub cycle
will not happen frequently and thus offset pairs associated with independent upsets will not occur
frequently. Dependent upsets pairs (such as those associated with an MCU), however, will occur
frequently. This means that the more times an offset happens the more likely it is the effect of a
single particle which indicates the presence of an MCU.. Hence, these offsets are likely part of an
MCU.
In the past, the MCOs to reconstruct MCUs have been chosen without statistical justification [51], [56]. However, that yields results that are hard to replicate using their technique.
Likewise, there are no guidelines for how to choose the MCOs for a given set of data. In this work,
the proposed method uses statistics to choose the MCOs.
To choose the MCOs from the frequency table, it is needed to compute the average number
of upsets for each scrub cycle. With this parameter, it is possible to calculate with Poisson statistics
the probability that a scrub cycle has two upsets. If this probability is high, any offset seen once
has likely been randomly generated and it is not part of the MCOs to reconstruct the MCUs.
Conversely, if an MCO is repeated in the data set the offset is likely part of an MCU.
The probability of having offsets repeated at least once in the data set can be computed
with Equation 5.1
 
2
u
P(O2 ) =
×
.
N −1
2
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(5.1)

In this equation P(O2 ) is the probability of at least one given offset repeated twice in the
experiment, N is the number of cells in the memory array which could be BRAM or CRAM, and
u is the average number of upsets per scrub cycle.
Equation 5.1 can be explained by dividing it into its two terms. The first term,

2
N−1

repre-

sents the probability that given an upset in any location, a second upset has two possible locations
to upset to generate a certain offset pair in the N − 1-size grid. The grid size is N-1 because there
is already an upset in the grid and because the equation assumes no border cases for simplicity.
The second term represents the combinations of two that can be done with u upsets in a
scrub cycle. The more upsets in a scrub cycle, the more combinations it will have and the more
likely an offset pair repeats twice.
Equation 5.1 can be extended to consider the number of scrub cycles in a data set. The idea
is that the more scrub cycles in the data, the more likely it is to have an offset pair shape repeated
twice. The probability of having a repeated shape becomes a conditional probability that has a
closed form representation

P(O2data set ) = 1 − (1 − a)c−1 ;

(5.2)

where a is the P(O2 ), and c is the number of scrub cycles in the data set.
To better understand the relationship between these two probabilities, consider the following example where a XA7C200T device with 59,145,600 CRAM bits is exposed to the LANSCE
neutron beam for 41069 scrub cycles. The results contain 65,935 upsets gathered through all the
tests. The average number of upsets per scrub cycle is 1.605. The probability that two offsets occur
in the same scrub cycle due to the randomness of the neutron beam can be evaluated with equation
5.1. The probability P(O2 ) is 6.74008 × 10−04 . This probability is about two orders of magnitude
lower than the probability of having two upsets in a scrub cycle (2.59 × 10−01 ) for this experiment
computed using Poisson statistics with λ = 1.605 and x = 2. The difference between these two
probabilities supports the claim that upsets with offsets that are seen repeatedly are likely to be part
of MCUs.
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It is possible that for future devices this observation will not hold or that eventually, much
more data on the same device will drive the probabilities closer. In that case, the equation can
be extended to evaluate the probability that an offset repeats three or more times. Given that
repetitions of an offset pair shape are independent probabilities a general equation is shown in
Equation 5.3; where r is the number of repetitions of offset pairs.

P(Or ) =

 r−1
2
u
×
× c.
2
N −1

(5.3)

However, after comparing the two probabilities as in the example above for all the experiments in this dissertation the low probability of repeated offset pairs have always pointed out to
the same conclusion. This conclusion is that if an offset repeats at least twice it is likely be part of
an MCU.

5.5

Reconstruction of MCUs
The final step in the process is to reconstruct MCUs from the actual upset data. Once the

MCOs are selected, these are used to reconstruct the MCUs. The reconstruction of MCUs is a
straightforward step that is based on the idea of searching in each scrub cycle for offset pairs that
are part of the set of MCOs. This is done by iterating through all the MCOs and comparing them
to the offsets of the upsets in the scrub cycle. All the upset pairs within a scrub cycle that have
an offset listed in the MCOs become part of an MCU. The reconstruction stops when all the scrub
cycles are analyzed.
Consider the example in Figure 5.3, where a scrub cycle experienced five upsets. Also,
for simplicity, consider only two MCOs: (0, −1), (1, 0). Figure 5.3 (a) plots the (x,y) location in
the scrub cycle. The algorithm takes the first MCO, (0, −1) for this case, and groups the bits into
MCUs. The result is shown in Figure 5.3 (b). The algorithm goes through all the selected MCOs
and groups the upsets into MCUs. For this example, the resulting MCUs are shown in Figure 5.3
(c). Then, the algorithm continues with the next scrub cycle. At the end of this step, two MCUs
are extracted from the upset data in this scrub cycle.
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Figure 5.3: Steps on the reconstruction of MCUs from upset data. (a) Shows 5 upsets that happened
within a scrub cycle. (b) Shows the grouping of MCUs after processing the first MCO (0,-1). (c)
Shows two MCUs after running through all MCOs.

5.6

Summary
This chapter explored a five-step method for the extraction of MCUs from radiation test

data. The method relies upon Poisson statistics because upsets in radiation tests on FPGAs follow
a Poisson distribution. The method involves identifying offset pairs that are dependent, i.e., that
are likely caused by the same particle strike. Then, these offsets pairs are used in the reconstruction
of MCUs.
The chapter showed the importance of performing a data filtering step to remove the contamination of micro-SEFIs. This is done by computing a parameter k that specifies a cut-off value
on the histogram of the number of upsets per scrub cycle. All scrub cycles that have k or more
upsets are identified as outliers in the histogram and removed from the data set.
The chapter then illustrated the process to compute the offset pairs for a subset of data.
Then, it shows the process of identifying the Most Common Offsets (MCOs) which are the offset
pairs that since they repeated more times than what was predicted using Poisson statistics, they are
part of an MCU.
Finally, using the MCOs from the last step, the chapter describes the process of reconstructing MCU with an example that contains two MCUs in a scrub cycle. This process of reconstruction
is done on each scrub cycle of the data. The process goes through all offset values contained in the
MCOs grouping any pair of upsets that have those offset values.
This five-step statistical method can identify MCUs from radiation-test data that contain
the logical location of upsets. The next step is to test this method with real radiation-test data. The
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next chapter shows how this method performs on radiation test data gathered on three different
FPGA families.
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CHAPTER 6.

MCU AND ANOMALY EXTRACTION RESULTS

This chapter applies the technique described in the previous chapter to several data sets
generated from several radiation tests. During these tests, Xilinx FPGAs from different families
were exposed to a high-energy neutron beam. This chapter uses the data of these experiments as a
case study to show the MCU extraction method followed with real data for the extraction of MCUs
and other anomalies.
The chapter starts by describing the radiation test setup used in the three experiments that
tested different FPGA devices. Then, the results for the identification of micro-SEFIs are discussed. This includes CRAM and BRAM results for the three experiments. Lastly, CRAM and
BRAM MCU results for the first experiment are presented.
Table 6.1 shows the tests that were analyzed in this work. Three of those tests are used
in this chapter. The rest of the results and references to the code that processed these data are
presented in Appendix D.
Table 6.1: List of radiation tests used to extract MCUs with the proposed technique.
Facility
LANSCE
LANSCE
LANSCE
*LANSCE
*CHIPIR
*TRIUMF
LANSCE
LANSCE
LANSCE
CHIPIR

Year
2016
2018
2018
2018
2018
2018
2019
2019
2019
2019

Device
XC7A200T
XC7A200T
XCKU040
XCZU9EG
XCKU040
XC7V980T
XC7K325T
XCKU040
XCKU9P
XCZU9EG
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Total Upsets
77,097
65,935
61,249
3,971
59,484
193,792
166,224
84,686
12,167
675

6.1

Radiation Testing
This section describes three neutron radiation tests that were performed to extract MCUs

and micro-SEFIs. A summary of each test is given along with an overview of the raw data. All
tests were performed on Xilinx devices.

LANSCE 2018
Three FPGAs from Xilinx were tested at the Los Alamos Neutron Science Center (LANSCE) in December 2018: Artix-7 (XC7A200T), Kintex Ultrascale (XCKU040), and an MPSOC
featuring the Zynq Ultrascale+ (XCZU9EG). Except for the data gathered from this test in the
Artix-7 (XC7A200T) device containing a Finite State Machine design, all other data corresponds
to static tests. As discussed previously, it is possible to gather radiation data for MCU extraction
with dynamic and static tests alike.
In the LANSCE experiments, the FPGA boards were all placed in series so that the neutrons
are exposed to all device. Figure 6.1 shows a stack of five XC7A200T boards aligned with the beam
and a XCKU040 board aligned with the beam too. The alignment of the boards was performed as
showed in Figure 6.2 with the KCU105 board that features an XCKU040. The arrow illustrates the
neutron particles’ trajectory which is normal to the FPGA.
CRAM data was read and scrubbed using the JTAG Configuration Manager (JCM) [73].
The JCM performed continuous reads and scrubs of the CRAM, logging every detected upset.
On average, the JCM was capable of performing a readback and scrub cycle every 0.25s for the
Artix-7 (XC7A200T), 4s for a Kintex Ultrascale (XCKU040), and 9s for the Zynq Ultrascale+
(XCZU9EG). Table 6.2 summarizes the details discussed for these tests. It additionally shows the
fluence, the number of bits in the CRAM of each device, and the expected number of upsets. This
last value was computed using the neutron cross-section specified by the manufacturer in [52].
BRAM upset data was obtained only for the XC7A200T during this test. In this experiment, BRAMs were loaded with three different patterns divided evenly into the 365 BRAMs in the
device. The patterns have BRAMs with all their bits set to 1, all their bits set to 0, and the third
pattern is a checkerboard pattern where ones and zeros are alternated throughout all the BRAM
content. Table 6.3 summarizes the BRAM parameters for radiation test.
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Figure 6.1: XC7A200T devices aligned with the neutron beam.

Table 6.2: Summary of test parameters for LANSCE 2018.
Technology
Fluence (n/cm2 )
Bits in CRAM
Scrub style
Scrub cycle time (s)
CRAM σ 1 (cm2 /bit)
Expected upsets per scrub cycle

XCZU9EG
FinFET 16nm
1.04 × 1011
142,693,248
JTAG
9
−16
2.67 × 10
0.282

XCKU040
CMOS 20nm
2.34 × 1011
102,800,448
JTAG
4
−15
2.55 × 10
0.862

XC7A200T
CMOS 28nm
1.59 × 1011
59,145,600
SelectMAP
0.25
6.99 × 10−15
0.0850

Table 6.3: Specifications for BRAM experiment.
Device
BRAM Bits
BRAM σ (cm2 /bit)
Fluence (n/cm2 )
Upsets per scrub cycle

XC7A200T
13,455,360
6.32 × 10−15
3.47 × 1010
0.0175

LANSCE 2019
A year later another test was performed at LANSCE in October of 2019. The experiment
tested the XC7K325T, XCKU040, and XCKU9P devices from Xilinx. This time two different
1 As

reported by Xilinx in the Device Reliability Report UG116 (v10.12).
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Figure 6.2: XCKU040 aligned with the neutron beam.

devices were tested and additional data was collected for the XCKU040 device. The XC7A200T
was changed for the XC7K325T, a bigger device of the same family. The XCZU9EG was changed
for an XCKU9P device that is the same device but without the hard core IP that the XCZU9EG
device has.
All the devices used the JCM to read and scrub the memories via JTAG. A summary of the
details of the experiment are shown in Table 6.4.
Table 6.4: Summary of test parameters for the three different devices at LANSCE 2019.
Technology
Fluence (n/cm2 )
Bits in CRAM
Scrub style
Scrub cycle time (s)
CRAM σ (cm2 /bit)
Expected upsets per scrub cycle

XCKU9P
FinFET16nm
3.20 × 1011
142,657,536
JTAG
9
2.67 × 10−16
0.381

XCKU040
CMOS 20nm
3.11 × 1011
102,800,448
JTAG
4
2.55 × 10−15
1.164

XC7K325T
CMOS 28nm
2.93 × 1011
72,823,424
JTAG
5
5.69 × 10−15
2.299

CHIPIR 2018
The third experiment was performed for the XCKU040 device at CHIPIR in the UK in
2018. The experiment consisted of a static design with BRAMs instantiated with preconfigured
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content. This experiment also used the JCM to configure, read, and scrub the data via JTAG. The
experiment details are listed in Table 6.5.
Table 6.5: Summary of test parameters for the XCKU040 at CHIPIR 2018.
Technology
Fluence (n/cm2 )
Bits in CRAM
Scrub style
Scrub cycle time (s)
CRAM Cross Section (cm2 /bit)
Expected upsets per scrub cycle

6.2

XCKU040
CMOS 20nm
2.38 × 1011
102,800,448
JTAG
4
2.55 × 10−15
5.243

Data Filtering
This section applies the filtering step of the method to the different experiments conducted

during the three radiation tests. This section discusses the findings after filtering contamination in
the form of micro-SEFIs from the CRAM FPGA data, as well as some BRAM data. The discussion
starts with CRAM contamination in the form of micro-SEFIs in each of the three experiments. The
section ends with results of micro-SEFIs that occur inside type 1 frames (the addresses that contain
the BRAM data).

6.2.1

CRAM Filtering Results

LANSCE 2018
The MCU extraction technique identified several micro-SEFI events in the three devices
tested in LANSCE 2018. The cut-off values that mark the number of upsets that are less than
10−10 likely to happen in a scrub cycle for the XC7A200T, XCKU040, and XCZU9EG, are 15,
15, and 13, respectively. The mean λ for the Poisson fit over the scrub-cycle histogram is 1.57,
1.61, and 1.17 upsets per scrub-cycle, respectively. Figure 6.3 shows the Poisson fit over the
distribution of scrub cycles for the XC7A200T device.
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Figure 6.3: Histogram of upsets in scrub cycles. The Poisson fit with λ = 1.57 is plotted in red.

Table 6.6 shows the number of micro-SEFIs for different sizes identified in the CRAM using the cut-off values. The size is the number of bits that are affected by the event. The Ultrascale+
device (XCZU9EG) had the largest number of events of size 40 or greater, while the XCKU040
experienced a higher count of small micro-SEFIs. The cross-section of these events is presented
in Table 6.7. A single event was assumed to compute the cross-section of micro-SEFIs with zero
occurrences [64].
Table 6.6: Identified micro-SEFIs of different sizes for each device at LANSCE 2018.
Device
Size 10-19 Size 20-29 Size 30-39 Size >40
XCZU9EG
0
0
0
32
XCKU040
2
7
7
0
XC7A200T
2
1
0
1

LANSCE 2019
For the LANSCE 2019 test, the cut-off value for the histogram with the number of upsets
per scrub cycle is 14, 17, and 19 for the XCKU9P, XCKU040, and XC7K325T, respectively. The
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Table 6.7: Micro-SEFIs cross section for three FPGA families at LANSCE 2018.
Device
XCZU9EG
XCKU040
XC7A200T

size 10-19
< 9.62 × 10−12
8.55 × 10−12
1.26 × 10−11

Cross section (cmˆ2)
size 20-29
size 30-39
−12
< 9.62 × 10
< 9.62 × 10−12
2.99 × 10−11
2.99 × 10−11
6.29 × 10−12
< 6.29 × 10−12

size >40
3.08 × 10−10
< 4.27 × 10−12
6.29 × 10−12

mean for the Poisson fit over the distribution in the same order is 1.43, 2.09, and 2.60. The number
of events is shown in Table 6.8, their cross-section is specified in Table 6.9.
Table 6.8: Micro-SEFIs count for each device during LANSCE 2019 experiment.
Device
Size 10-19 Size 20-29 Size 30-39 Size >40
XCKU9P
0
0
0
2
XCKU040
0
0
11
0
XC7K325T
2
1
0
1

Table 6.9: micro-SEFIs cross section for LANSCE 2019.
Cross section (cmˆ2)
Device
size 10-19
size 20-29
size 30-39
size >40
−12
−12
−12
XCKU9P < 3.13 × 10
< 3.13 × 10
< 3.13 × 10
6.25 × 10−12
−12
−12
−11
XCKU040 < 3.22 × 10
< 3.22 × 10
3.54 × 10
3.22 × 10−12
XC7K325T
6.83 × 10−12
3.41 × 10−12
< 3.41 × 10−12 3.41 × 10−12

CHIPIR 2018
For the CHIPIR 2018 test, the cut-off value to mark the improbable number of upsets per
scrub cycle is 22 for the XCKU040 device. The mean for the Poisson fit over the distribution is
3.63. The number of events and their cross-sections is presented in Table 6.10.

6.2.2

BRAM Filtering Results
For BRAM resources, the proposed technique identified three different sized micro-SEFI

events for the XC7A200T: one 16-bit, five 128-bit, one 1024-bit, and one 1025-bit event. Their
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Table 6.10: Micro-SEFIs count and cross-section for the CHIPIR test on the XCKU040 device.
Size 10-19
Size 20-29
Size 30-39
Size >40
Count
0
19
21
5
Cross Section (cm2 ) < 4.20 × 10−12 7.98 × 10−11 8.82 × 10−11 2.10 × 10−11
cross-sections are shown in Table 6.11. In this table the 1025-bit event is considered the same
as the 1024-bit event when computing the cross-section. It is worth mentioning that the 128-bit
events are not in the BRAM data itself but rather happened in type 1 frames. These events could
affect features of the BRAM that were not exercised on these tests. For the experiments presented
in this paper, the BRAMs were used as single block 36Kb memories and tested with ECC enable
and disable.
Table 6.11: Cross section for micro-SEFI events on the BRAMs of the XC7A200T.
Event size
Cross section (cmˆ2)

16
1.07 × 10−17

128
2.14 × 10−18

1024
4.28 × 10−18

The results for the CHIPIR 2018 test shows similar micro-SEFI events in the XCKU040
device. These micro-SEFIs have a larger range, and the largest event affected 5311 bits of data.
The count and their cross-section are presented in Table 6.12.
Table 6.12: Micro-SEFIs count and cross-section for BRAMs at the CHIPIR test on the XCKU040
device.
Size
Count
Cross Section (cm2 )

128
19
7.98 × 10−11

512
1
4.20 × 10−12

1280
1
4.20 × 10−12

1410-1415
5
2.10 × 10−11

1536-1548
20
8.40 × 10−11

>4962
2
8.40 × 10−12

An experiment was performed with all the BRAMs instantiated on the XC7A200T to analyze further the BRAM micro-SEFIs. After injecting all the essential bits, no micro-SEFI was
detected. This result is expected as not all of the CRAM bits are addressable, and the type 1 frames
where BRAM data and other configuration is located are part of those inaccessible bits. However,
interestingly six bits in minor 27 caused an SCU in a single type-1 frame.
However, the 1024-bit events happened in the BRAM data. These events affected the same
two bits in each of the 512 words in the BRAM. With the Single Error Correction Double Error
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Detection (SECDED) code that can be enabled in 7-series BRAMs [77], the 1024-bit event would
cause SECDED to report all the words as uncorrectable. Furthermore, the 1025-bit event would
affect 511 words with a double error, and the remaining word would have three upsets. Given
the functionality of SECDED, this three-bit event would be treated as a single-bit error. SECDED
would attempt to correct this error but instead, introduce another error into this word.

6.3

MCU Results
After filtering the contamination from the micro-SEFIs the resulting data set is used to

perform the remaining steps to reconstruct MCUs. These steps are the computation of the offsets,
the selection of the most common offsets, and finally, the reconstruction of MCUs. This section
shows the results after applying those steps for CRAM and BRAM FPGA data.

6.3.1

CRAM MCU Results

LANSCE 2018
In the filtering process, the mean of the Poisson distribution over the number of upsets
per scrub cycle and the cut-off value become known parameters. These values are presented in
Table 6.13. Likewise, the table shows two other values that are computed using the mean of the
Poisson distribution. These values are the probability of two or more upsets in a scrub cycle and
the probability of an offset pair happening twice. These values are needed to select the MCOs that
will be used to reconstruct the MCUs.
Table 6.13: Average upsets per non-zero scrub cycle and probability of CSEU for neutron data
gathered at LANSCE 2018.
Device
XC7A200T
XCKU040
XCZU9EG

Avg. upsets per
scrub cycles
1.57
1.61
1.17

Cut-off
value
15
15
13
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Probability of
2+ Upsets
0.4768
0.4937
0.3263

Probability of
any one shape
3.4 × 10−8
1.9 × 10−8
1.4 × 10−8

Before continuing with the results of the MCU extraction, it is worth illustrating the importance of filtering the data before extracting MCUs. Consider Figure 6.4 which shows an unfiltered
heatmap for radiation testing data on the XCZU9EG part. Each square on the heatmap represents
an offset that happened x frames and y bits away from the origin (depicted as a black square). The
scale is a cold/hot scale that goes from dark blue for the upsets that repeated the least to red for the
upsets that repeated the most. The two long red lines on the left and the blocks of bits circled in
green are contamination that came from micro-SEFIs.
Figure 6.5 shows the heatmap after filtering the data by removing scrub cycles with an
unlikely number of offsets. The heatmap becomes much cleaner with all the red blocks of contamination gone. Thus, the heatmap shows the offset pairs that are likely part of MCUs. The
green blocks and the red lines that appeared before filtering the data jeopardize the identification
of MCUs, as they introduce incorrect MCOs.

Figure 6.4: Heatmap of patterns for the XCZU9EG data before filtering. Blue color indicates few
repetitions of the offset, while red color indicates that the offset happened more frequently.

To further stress the importance of filtering, the MCOs were computed for the unfiltered
and filtered data shown in Figure 6.4 and Figure 6.5. The unfiltered data shows that the four offsets
that repeated the most are (0, -1), (0, -2), (0, -3), and (0,-4). The filtered data shows that the four
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Figure 6.5: Heatmap of patterns for the XCZU9EG data after filtering. Blue color indicates few
repetition of the offset, while red color indicates that the offset happened more frequently.

offsets that repeated the most are (1, 0), (1, -1), (3, -2), (1, 1). This is important because MCOs that
should be disregarded can cause an increased number of MCUs or a merge of MCUs into bigger
ones.
It is then, after filtering the data, that the offsets must be computed. Table 6.14 shows a
snippet of the offset pairs ordered by frequency and the count of each during the LANSCE 2018
test for the XC7A200T device. Then, the MCOs are chosen based on the probability that a given
offset pair occur more frequently than expected. The MCO selection is done by computing the
probability that a scrub cycle has two or more upsets. Since this probability is high, any offset pair
that appeared once has likely been randomly generated and it is not an MCU. Given that an offset
pair is seen once, the probability of that same offset pair happening again is modeled by Eq. 4.3.
The results for each device are shown in the last column of Table 6.13. The highest probability of
seeing any offset pair twice is 3.4 × 10−8 for the Artix-7 200t. Since the probability of having the
same offset pair twice is low, all the offset pairs with more than one occurrence are used for the
MCU reconstruction. For this example, 22, 000 out of over 550, 000 offset pairs were used for the
reconstruction. More details of the selection of the MCOs can be found in Section 5.4.
After choosing the MCOs, the MCUs are reconstructed following the reconstruction step.
The number of MCUs and SCUs are shown in Table 6.15. For the XC7A200T device, 27.7% of
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Table 6.14: Example of offset pairs for the XC7A200T device during LANSCE neutron radiation
test.
index
1
2
3
4
5
6
...
294
295
301
302
303
...
22069
22117
22118
...

x
1
0
1
1
0
1
...
128
6
4
7424
7424
...
0
4193379
4193389
...

y
-1
-1
0
1
-2
-2
...
0
10
-27
873
872
...
-972
-201
-1098
...

Count
186572
101149
84755
66803
31488
27444
...
9
9
8
8
8
...
2
1
1
...

events were MCUs, for the XCKU040 14.59% and for the XCZU9EG 5.59%. For the XC7A200T
device, 37.84% of bits were upset due to MCUs, for the XCKU040 27.10% and for the XCZU9EG
11.66%. The broad range in this results are a topic for future work.
Table 6.15: Number of MCUs and SCUs found in LANSCE 2018 experiments.
Device
XC7A200T
XCKU040
XCZU9EG

Total Upsets
65, 935
61, 249
3, 971

SCUs
30, 186
44, 649
3, 508

MCUs
11, 567 (27.70%)
7, 628 (14.59%)
208 (5.59%)

MCU affected bits
24, 949 (37.84%)
16, 600 (27.10%)
463 (11.66%)

Table 6.16: Breakdown of MCUs by their size for LANSCE 2018 experiments.
Device
XC7A200T
XCKU040
XCZU9EG

MCU-2
78.53%
92.61%
85.10%

MCU-3
6.88%
3.80%
10.58%

MCU-4
6.66%
2.37%
2.40%
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MCU-5
2.16%
0.60%
0.96%

MCU-6
3.19%
0.17%
0.48%

MCU-7+
2.58%
0.44%
0.48%

Table 6.16 breaks down the MCUs based on their sizes, showing the percentages for each
size. Except for the XC7A200T device, for the rest of the devices, the number of MCUs decreases
as their size increases. In the particular case of the XC7A200T device, the device experienced an
unexpected number of 6-bit MCUs. The expected number of 6-bit MCUs should be within the
range of the percentage of 5-bit and 7-bit MCUs, this is between 2.16% and 1.75%.
The particular reason for having more 6-bit MCUs is unknown, however, a hypothesis
suggests that a 6-bit micro-SEFI was repeatedly occurring in the design. This could be because
the data comes from a dynamic design that might be using 6 bits of a resource that is repeatedly
affected by radiation. For example, this could be that six bits of data are stored in a memory LUT,
or another memory element, and are getting reset repeatedly. Refer to Chapter 7 for a discussion
on filtering additional micro-SEFIs with fault injection.
Table 6.17 shows the 20 most common MCUs that seen in another LANSCE 2018 experiment on the XC7A200T device for a dynamic test. The first column of the table specifies the shape
with offsets, the second column shows the frequency of each MCU, and the third column shows
the percentage from the total of 104,221 MCUs seen in the experiment.

CHIPIR 2018
In the CHIPIR test, the XCKU040 device was the only device tested. For this test, the
cut-off value to filter the data is 22. The mean of the Poisson fit over the distribution of upsets per
scrub cycle is 3.63.
The number of MCUs and the SCUs are shown in Table 6.18. MCUs accounted for 18.88%
of all events in the device. Likewise, the number of bits affected by the 9, 184 MCUs accounted
for 33.18% off all the affected bits during the test. The breakdown of the MCUs identified based
on their sizes is shown in Table 6.19.

LANSCE 2019
In the LANSCE 2019 test, three devices were tested: the XCKU9P, the XCKU040, and
the XC7K325T. For this test, the cut-off value is 14, 17, and 19 for the XCKU9P, XCKU040, and
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Table 6.17: Most frequent MCU shapes for LANSCE 2018 test from the XC7A200T device.
Shape
[(0, 0), (1, -1)]
[(0, 0), (1, 1)]
[(0, 0), (1, 0)]
[(0, 0), (0, -1), (1, -1), (1, -2)]
[(0, 0), (0, -1)]
[(0, 0), (0, -1), (1, 1), (1, 0)]
[(0, 0), (0, -1), (1, -1)]
[(0, 0), (1, 0), (1, -1)]
[(0, 0), (1, 1), (1, 0)]
[(0, 0), (0, -1), (1, 0)]
[(0, 0), (0, -1), (0, -2), (1, -1), (1, -2), (1, -3)]
[(0, 0), (2, 0)]
[(0, 0), (0, -1), (1, 0), (1, -1)]
[(0, 0), (0, -1), (0, -2)]
[(0, 0), (0, -1), (0, -2), (0, -3), (1, -1), (1, -2), (1, -3), (1, -4)]
[(0, 0), (1, -1), (2, 0), (3, -1)]
[(0, 0), (3, -1)]
[(0, 0), (0, -1), (1, 0), (1, -1), (1, -2)]
[(0, 0), (0, -1), (0, -2), (1, -1), (1, -2)]

Frequency
51059
14367
11558
3708
2358
1772
1507
1457
1010
847
845
733
503
499
266
256
234
230
228

Percentage
48.99%
13.79%
11.09%
3.56%
2.26%
1.70%
1.45%
1.40%
0.97%
0.81%
0.81%
0.70%
0.48%
0.48%
0.26%
0.25%
0.22%
0.22%
0.22%

Table 6.18: Number of MCUs and SCUs found in CHIPIR 2018 experiment.
Device
XCKU040

Total Upsets
59484

SCUs
39454

MCUs
9184 (18.88%)

MCU affected bits
19739 (33.18%)

Table 6.19: Breakdown of MCUs by their size for CHIPIR 2018 experiment.
Device
XCKU040

MCU 2
91.96%

MCU 3
3.72%

MCU 4
2.96%

MCU 5
0.60%

MCU 6
0.33%

MCU 7+
0.42%

XC7K325T, respectively. The mean for the Poisson fit over the distribution in the same order is
1.43, 2.09, and 2.60.
The number of MCUs and the SCUs are shown in Table 6.20. MCUs accounted for 18.88%
of all events in the device. Likewise, the number of bits affected by the 9, 184 MCUs accounted
for 33.18% off all the affected bits during the test. The breakdown of the MCUs identified based
on their sizes is shown in Table 6.21.
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Table 6.20: Number of MCUs and SCUs found in LANSCE 2019 experiments.
Device
XC7K325T
XCKU040
XCKU9P

Total Upsets
166224
84686
12167

SCUs
77259
65847
10571

MCUs
31333 (28.85%)
8812 (11.80%)
719(6.36%)

MCU affected bits
89965 (53.52%)
18839(22.24%)
1596(13.11%)

Table 6.21: Breakdown of MCUs by their size for LANSCE 2019 experiments.
Device
XC7K325T
XCKU040
XCKU9P

6.3.2

MCU 2
69.55%
92.13%
87.07%

MCU 3
5.57%
3.65%
8.07%

MCU 4
14.24%
3.18%
2.78%

MCU 5
2.27%
0.46%
1.39%

MCU 6
3.81%
0.20%
0.20%

MCU 7+
4.56%
0.37%
0.50%

BRAM MCU Results
This section describes the BRAM results for the XC7A200T device when tested at LAN-

SCE 2018. This is the only device shown because it contains more upset data than other devices. In
this test, all 365 BRAMs in the XC7A200T were instantiated for a static neutron test. A summary
of the acquired data is presented in Table 6.22.
Almost three thousand upsets were experienced in the BRAMs. All of those were used
to perform the MCU data extraction. The probability that an MCU identified with the MCUextraction method was a CSEU is shown in Table 6.22. The low probability shows that the identification of MCUs was reliable.
Table 6.22: Summary of BRAM acquired data at LANSCE 2018 for the XC7A200T.
Device
BRAM Bits
Fluence (n/cm2 )
Upsets
Avg. upsets per scrub cycle
P(CSEU)
Identified MCUs

XC7A200T
59,145,600
3.47 × 1010
2951
1.27
1.49 × 10−7
207

Table 6.23 shows the size of each of the 207 MCUs identified. The row labeled scrub cycles
with n upsets shows the number of scrub cycles that have n upsets in them and a percentage of how
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many of those scrub cycles had an MCU. Some of the scrub cycles might have unidentified MCUs;
however, there is not enough information since the shape of the upsets comprising the possible
MCU only happened once.
Table 6.23: Number of detected MCUs and corresponding scrub cycles with exactly n upsets.

# of MCUs
Scrub cycles with
n upsets

6.4

2
180
364
(49.4%)

MCU Size (n)
3
4
16
10
75
27
(21.3%) (37.0%)

5
1
6
(16.7%)

Summary
This chapter explored the use of the proposed statistical method on radiation test data from

three different facilities. The chapter started with the description of each of the three tests and
devices tested in them. In total, five different FPGAs from three Xilinx FPGA families were tested
with neutron particles. The data analyzed in this chapter contained CRAM data for the five devices
plus some BRAM data of one of the devices.
Then, the chapter shows the results of the filtering step. In this step, the cut-off values and
the mean λ for the Poisson fit over the number of upsets per scrub cycle were computed. With
this information, micro-SEFIs were identified and removed from the data set. The data shows
that the Kintex Ultrascale + devices (XCKU9P and XCZU9EG) have the highest number of large
micro-SEFIs while the XCKU040 has the highest number of micro-SEFIs that affect less than 40
bits.
The data filtering was also applied to the BRAM data. The information revealed with
the filtering step was interesting because it showed micro-SEFIs of three different sizes for the
XC7A200T. While for the XCKU040 device, similar micro-SEFI sizes were found.
Due to the interesting results, an additional analysis was performed to understand the
impact these micro-SEFIs have on the BRAM data. This analysis looked at where were the
bits affected in the micro-SEFIs within the BRAM of the devices. The results show that in the
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XC7A200T the 2014-bit micro-SEFIs affected two bits of the 512 words in a BRAM. This is important because this particular micro-SEFI will make the data on the whole BRAM unrecoverable.
After filtering the data, the chapter resumed with the extraction of MCUs for every experiment. This starts with a discussion of how unfiltered data can affect the computation of offset
pairs. This discussion showed an example of the MCOs before removing contamination of microSEFIs and after removing them. The discussion strengthens the idea that removing micro-SEFIs is
needed to identify MCUs in radiation data.
The chapter then showed the results of the MCU extraction. These results include the
percentage of MCUs from the total number of events in each FPGA. Also, the results showed the
breakdown of the MCU sizes for each device.
One interesting result was the number of 6-bit MCUs found in the data corresponding
to a dynamic test of the XC7A200T performed at LANSCE 2018. The number of 6-bit MCUs
was higher than that of 7-bit MCUs, which is unusual because all the other results suggest that
the number of MCUs of a particular size decreases as the size increases. This finding drove the
hypothesis that some micro-SEFIs could have happened in the device. This discussion is extended
in Chapter 7.
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CHAPTER 7.

FILTERING ADDITIONAL MICRO-SEFIS WITH FAULT INJECTION

Another assessment method that is used to test FPGAs is fault injection. Fault injection
changes the content of the CRAM in the FPGA to emulate that a fault occurred. Since changing
the CRAM content is an interaction purely done at the logical level, this assessment method does
not help to uncover MCUs. However, it can be used to inject MCUs and extract other anomalies.
This chapter starts by describing the use of fault injection to evaluate the reliability of
FPGAs. Then, the chapter discusses the use of fault injection to identify additional micro-SEFIs.
This is illustrated with neutron data from LANSCE 2018. Finally, the chapter shows two methods
based on fault injections that can be used to extract micro-SEFIs in FPGA designs. One method
uses radiation test data while the other method uses Xilinx design tools.

7.1

Fault Injection
This section describes single-bit fault injection for SRAM FPGAs to understand the use

of fault injection for the identification of micro-SEFIs. Moreover, this overview of fault injection
sets the basis for understanding the impact of performing fault injection with MCUs described in
Chapter 8. This section starts with a description of general fault injection and the elements involved
in a fault injection test. The section ends with a detailed description of the fault injection flow.
To estimate the sensitivity of an FPGA design, faults can be induced or introduced into the
design. Testing the designs can be performed using both fault injection and beam testing. During
fault injection, faults are emulated by changing the content of the CRAM of the FPGA. Fault
injection is usually performed one bit at a time to simulate radiation-induced SEUs. During beam
testing, as discussed before, SEUs are induced with the irradiation of high-energy particles on the
device under test (DUT).
Sensitivity testing through fault injection is event-based. The event is usually the occurrence of a functional failure within the design. Fault injection approaches depend on the ability
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to detect when the design under test stops performing correctly [64]. Fault injection approaches
for sensitivity testing create an environment where a design can fail, and then, the platform should
measure and record the factors that lead up to that failure for its analysis.
Fault injection is a process where upsets are introduced artificially into the CRAM of the
FPGA. The purpose of these upsets is to test the response of specific designs when they occur. This
process can be done using hardware, software, or simulation tools. Although the mechanism for
inserting faults into the CRAM is different from radiation testing, fault injection can provide essential information on the sensitivity of FPGA designs to CRAM upsets and provide early estimates
on the effectiveness of SEU mitigation techniques [78].
Most FPGA fault injection systems include the following steps: (1) intentionally inject a
fault into the CRAM of an FPGA configured with a specific design, (2) operate the FPGA design
under the fault condition with test vectors, (3) identify design or system failures, (4) repair the
injected fault, and (5) log FPGA design behavior under faulty conditions. This basic approach
seeks to understand how faults affect the behavior of FPGA designs when subjected to radiationinduced faults. In most cases, only a single CRAM bit is altered to estimate the sensitivity of a
design to single-event upsets. More details of the fault injection flow in FPGA is described in
Section 7.1.1
There are five common elements found in most fault injection SEU sensitivity testing approaches. First, there is a design under test (DUT). Second, there is a monitor connected to the
output of the DUT that should look for errors. Third, there is a fault injection platform used to introduce possible failure conditions within the DUT. Fourth, a logging mechanism that records the
factors leading up to failure, such as the number of injected faults. Finally, a recovery mechanism
is needed to place the design back into a known good state after a failure has occurred to allow for
additional failure events to be observed.
In fault injection sensitivity testing, the DUT remains active so that functional failures can
occur and be detected. Testing the DUT in all modes of operation is vital during fault injection to
detect failures caused by injected faults. Tested designs are typically stressed or stimulated through
a set of input data vectors [64].
Two common methods exist to monitor the outputs of the DUT for errors. First, the DUT
output is compared against a set of generated golden output vectors that match the expected DUT
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output. This method is easier to implement because no additional hardware is needed to compare
the output of the DUT with the results. Moreover, the results can be processed later on, allowing
researchers to run back-to-back tests rapidly.
In the second method, the output of the DUT is compared against that of an identical
design instance that operates in lockstep with the DUT. The identical design instance of this second
method is referred to as a golden design instance. If any differences in the outputs of the DUT and
the golden design instance are found, a functional failure is detected and reported. This setup is
more involved to implement but comes with the advantage of additional flexibility where tests can
be run without the need of knowing the expected results [79].
In a typical fault injection test, only the DUT is exposed to faults through fault injection.
Other components such as a test control unit, functional error detection logic, and the golden output
vectors or lockstep golden design instances are commonly separated from the DUT to isolate them
from injected faults. For example, fault injection platforms may place the DUT on a separate
FPGA, while keeping the rest in other devices. This FPGA is then injected with faults to ensure
that no faults are introduced into other platform components, and they only occur within the DUT.
Several parameters have to be recorded to have a successful fault injection test with meaningful data. The factors that lead up to a functional failure are recorded for analysis. Additionally,
the total number of faults injected and failures observed should also be collected. These data can
be used to estimate the sensitivity of the design to SCU, MCU, or for the event in the matter. Also,
the particular logical location of the bit injected before a functional failure may be recorded for reproducibility and failure characterization. To have statistically significant and representative data
of a particular design, Many events must be observed within the collected data [64], [78].
To properly detect and observe multiple failure events in a single fault injection test, most
fault injection testing approaches provide a method of resetting the design. This method will
reset the DUT, and any other needed logic, into a known good state so that additional failure
events can be properly detected and observed. The DUT is provided with any necessary control or
reset signals. The process of resynchronizing or resetting the design for the next test run is often
automated to assist in rapid data collection. More details on the general fault injection setup and
flow are described in the following section.
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7.1.1

Fault Injection Test Flow
This subsection describes all the steps in the general test flow followed during fault injec-

tion testing. This flow consists of the steps shown in Figure 7.1. These seven steps are FPGA
configuration, fault location selection, fault injection, failure detection, device recovery, failure
classification, and DUT repair.

Figure 7.1: Basic Fault Injection Flow
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FPGA Configuration
The first requirement in a fault injection test is to configure the DUT into a known working
state. Upon initial configuration, the DUT must be actively operating in a state with no faults. This
can be done by performing an initial status check right after configuration. This check ensures that
the DUT is operating as expected and that any detected faults from fault injection will be properly
identified and classified.

Fault Location Selection
The next step is to select the location in the CRAM where the fault will be injected. Generally, there are two approaches for selecting the fault location. These two approaches are a random
or targeted selection.
Random fault injection consists of selecting a random frame, word, and bit in the CRAM as
the fault to inject. This form of bit selection is similar to what might occur in a radiation test facility
and is often used to predict what will happen during radiation testing. Random fault injection has
an equal likelihood of upsetting any bit within the CRAM of the FPGA.
Targeted fault injection selects specific CRAM bits or device tiles to inject as specified by
a user-generated file or some other user implemented method [80], [81]. This form of bit selection
is often used to “replay” upsets collected at a radiation test facility. Another example of targeted
fault injection includes only injecting faults into user flip-flops or injecting faults into essential

1

or critical bits.
Both approaches offer advantages and disadvantages. Random fault injection is often used
to mimic the random nature of SEUs observed during radiation beam tests. Random fault selection is also easy to implement as the random location is selected from a range of valid CRAM
addresses within the DUT. However, random fault injection may not be the best selection method.
Targeted fault injection can provide a more controlled approach to fault injection by selecting specific CRAM bits to inject and provide the ability to replay SEUs collected from radiation tests.
1 These

bits can be generated through optional settings using Xilinx design tools. These bits are bits in the CRAM
that are likely critical to the design functionality.
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Inject Fault
After the fault location selection, the fault is injected into the DUT. This injection is performed by inserting the fault into the DUT CRAM. It is common for the fault injection platform
to implement some method to confirm the fault has been injected successfully. For example, after
inserting the fault into the DUT CRAM, it is common to read the same CRAM address immediately following the injection. Reading the same CRAM address and confirming the bit value has
changed ensures the fault was inserted successfully.

Error Detection
There are two main approaches to monitor DUT output signals and detect errors. The first
approach compares the DUT output to a golden set of predetermined output data that matches the
expected output of the DUT. For fault injection, this output vector could be stored internally in
the device or externally and compared off-chip to determine if a has occurred in the output. The
second approach compares the DUT output against the golden design instance output running in
lockstep with the DUT. The output from both designs is compared, detecting any differences in the
output and reporting errors as necessary.

Device Recovery
To accurately detect and observe all failure events during fault injection, the fault injection
flow needs to provide a method to recover or reset the DUT into a known good state of operation.
This often means performing a resynchronization to reset the DUT and ensure the DUT is free of
faults. This can be performed through a complete DUT reconfiguration or power cycling of the
device.
This behavior is essential to ensure that no failure event caused by a previous injection
is logged or counted in subsequent injections. This ensures that additional failure events can be
properly observed and logged during a single fault injection test.
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Classify Failure
When a failure event is detected, the event must be logged and classified. The data that is
logged and classified during this step includes the injected bit location or address within the DUT
CRAM and the severity classification that the failure caused. For example, some failures may be
fixed by simply restoring the injected bit to the original value, or the failure may require a complete
DUT reconfiguration to eliminate it from the system and restore the DUT to a known good state.
Additionally, during the fault injection test, it is essential to record the total number of
injected faults and the total number of detected failures. The logging of these bits allows for
future tests to better reproduce failures in the DUT and characterize failure modes. This data
collection and classification ensures that the SEU sensitivity estimate calculated from the fault
injection results is accurate.

Repair Fault
Repairing the injected fault means restoring the injected CRAM bit to the original value
written to the SRAM cell during the initial configuration. The injected fault may be repaired at
different stages of testing as shown in Figure 7.1. This repair may take place directly after an error
has been detected and classified, or if no error is detected after an injection. Regardless of the
consequence of each injection, the DUT needs to be restored into a known working stage.

7.1.2

Fault Injection vs Radiation Testing
Before performing a radiation test, it is recommended that fault injection testing is per-

formed to understand how the design will respond when upsets are present in the system. Fault
injection may expose undesirable responses to failure. For example, the design may experience
failures too often to even consider it as a suitable candidate for radiation testing. Another example
is that an automatic recovery method might not detect certain failures, leading the system to fail
to recover as intended. Failing to perform fault injection tests can result in missing data, misspent
money, and wasted beam time.
Although fault injection can provide insights into the behavior of FPGA designs affected
by radiation-induced upsets, it has some important limitations when compared to radiation testing.
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First, not all internal state elements and CRAM bits in the device can be upset during fault injection.
Not all bits in the CRAM can be injected as certain bits are not user-accessible. Many state bits are
not user-accessible and thus cannot be artificially upset. As such, fault injection will not be able to
expose a variety of circuit behaviors that may be seen in radiation testing [82]. To observe upsets
on these bits, the most viable option is to perform radiation testing.
The second limitation of fault injection comes with the common method that is currently
used to perform injections. Fault injection does not insert faults in the same manner as radiation
testing. In most approaches, fault injection involves upsetting a single CRAM bit [83], [84], monitoring failures, and returning the bit to its original value. This single-bit injection is unlike the
behavior seen in radiation testing in which multiple bit upsets are often observed. Because of this
limitation, most fault injection approaches fail to emulate the actual upset behavior seen in radiation testing and radiation environments. Sometimes, the method is changed to inject bits without
returning them to their original value until a failure is seen. This type of testing simulates fault
accumulation, which is normally overcome with the use of scrubbing in FPGA systems.
One difference between fault injection and radiation testing is that faults generally do not
arrive in the same timely manner as in radiation tests. Depending on the results sought, this can
be a limitation. For example, if the goal is to mimic the behavior of the beam through fault injection. However, efforts to reproduce radiation test results have been performed several times in the
literature.
In [85], authors have described an approach to reproduce ground testing results of a microprocessor using fault injection. In this work, the temporal nature of fault insertion is not a concern
as the intent is to allow the fault to propagate throughout the design. By injecting faults before
starting the execution of a program, this fault injection approach allows for maximum propagation
of each fault and facilitates getting reproducible results.
In [86] authors extracted patterns seen in the DUT from a neutron radiation test. Based on
the patterns seen, they mention that it is possible to perform a Fault Injection (FI) test that follows
the beam distribution to improve the statistics gathered by fault injection. This work did not use
these pattern data for subsequent fault injection or use these data to demonstrate specific failure
modes.
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7.2

Filtering micro-SEFIs
Fault injection to identify micro-SEFIs is similar to the flow of fault injection for sensitivity

assessment. The difference is only in the interpretation of results. In FI for micro-SEFi identification, single-bit injections are performed. If more than one bit gets upset, then, that bit is flagged as
a cause of micro-SEFI and all the bits upset are flagged as a micro-SEFI.
The LANSCE results for the XC7A200T FPGA in Chapter 6 (refer to Table 6.16) show that
there might be another 6-bit event that was misclassified as an MCU. This section is driven by the
hypothesis that a micro-SEFI could be hidden in those results. The goal is to find the micro-SEFIs
and to generalize the steps to identify micro-SEFIs in FPGA designs.
This section starts by describing the approach taken in the XC7A200T case study. Then,
the section describes two general approaches that can be performed to identify micro-SEFIs in
FPGA designs. All of these approaches are based on the use of fault injection.

7.2.1

Case Study: 6-bit Event on the XC7A200T
In the previous chapter (Chapter 6), MCUs were identified from several experiments. The

results showed that for the XC7A200T device in the LANSCE 2018 test there was a higher count
of 6-bit MCUs. Some of the MCUs identified could be different events. An additional step has to
be executed to identify the possible micro-SEFI in the experiment.
The additional step discussed in this section was motivated by the results of the XC7A200T
device during the LANSCE 2018 dynamic test. The device experienced a higher number of 6-bit
MCUs than expected from looking at the 5-bit and 7-bit MCU count for this experiment. It is
expected to have the number of MCUs decrease as the size of them increases.
Although it is hard to know exactly why those 6-bit patterns were occurring, a hypothesis
was formulated that says that a micro-SEFI affecting six bits was repeatedly occurring in the device. This is possible for two main reasons. First, the data gathered on the XC7A200T was part
of a dynamic test that had multiple copies of the b13 benchmark finite state machine running in
the device. Second, micro-SEFIs clearing the data of LUTs have been previously found on Xilinx
devices.

80

Driven by this hypothesis, the next step in this work was to use an approach based on fault
injection to attempt identifying micro-SEFIs on the lower set of data (as discussed at the end of
the micro-SEFI results on the LANSCE 2018 data). With this fault injection test, out of the 312
6-bit MCUs identified previously, 120 turned out to be 6-bit micro-SEFIs. After appropriately
excluding the micro-SEFIs from the 6-bit event count, the percentage of 6-bit MCUs came down
to 1.96%. Table 7.1 shows the percentage breakdown of MCUs for the XC7A200T device during
the LANSCE 2018 test.
Table 7.1: Breakdown of MCUs after filtering additional micro-SEFIs on the lower set of the data
for the XC7A200T device tested at LANSCE 2018.
Device
XC7A200T

MCU 2
79.51%

MCU 3
6.96%

MCU 4
6.73%

MCU 5
2.18%

MCU 6
1.99%

MCU 7
1.77%

MCU 8+
0.84%

It is worth pointing out that after excluding the micro-SEFI events, it is necessary to recompute the offsets. Figure 7.2 shows the modified flow after adding this additional step to the
statistical technique to extract MCUs from radiation test data. After doing so, no difference was
found in the MCO selected for this particular experiment. This illustrates the need to perform fault
injection in the lower set of the data and remove further contamination from micro-SEFIs (refer to
Section 6.2).
The filtered data for the XC7A200T of the LANSCE 2018 test is used to perform an additional step consisting of the injection of each bit of the micro-SEFIs filtered during the filtering
step of the MCU reconstruction. Interestingly, not all of the identified micro-SEFIs were repeatable
through this process. About 13% were repeatable through fault injection. There are two possible
explanations we have for these results. The first explanation is related to upsets in CRAM bits. The
bit causing the micro-SEFIs may not be readable in the CRAM or may not be part of the CRAM,
so it is not present on the scrub cycle upset list. Moreover, this bit may not be injectable, so even
performing an exhaustive fault injection would not uncover the source bit causing the micro-SEFI.
The second explanation is a transient event in some control circuitry, e.g. a reset line, that could
modify a set of bits at once.
In some cases, a micro-SEFI can be directly mapped to a specific CRAM bit, and thus it
is straightforward to reproduce the event. This is of special interest because even though micro81

Figure 7.2: Flow diagram showing the six steps involved in the statistical technique to extract
MCUs.

SEFIs have a low cross-section, mapping them to a specific resource within an FPGA provides
engineers with additional knowledge to leverage the reliability of the design by limiting the use of
the affected resource. For example, if memory LUTs are affected by micro-SEFIs it will be a wise
decision to limit the use of LUTs as memories and store the data somewhere else.
From these observations, two methods are described in the next subsection that can identify
micro-SEFIs in FPGA designs. Both methods use fault injection to achieve this goal. One of the
methods needs radiation testing while the second method needs a set of target CRAM-bits that can
be found using Xilinx design tools.
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7.2.2

Generalized Methods to Identify Additional Micro-SEFIs
As discussed in Section 7.1, fault injection artificially injects upsets into the FPGA memory

to mimic the upset behavior seen in a radiation environment. This testing method offers a lowercost approach in testing the reliability of FPGA devices. Also, FI offers the ability to implement
constrained testing parameters such as targeting specific bits or elements in the device [79].
Two methods to classify micro-SEFIs are created based on fault injection. Both approaches
take advantage of the ability to target specific bits of interest to identify micro-SEFIs. Likewise,
these two approaches inject faults into the content of user-accessible CRAM bits of the FPGA
using the JCM [73].

Method 1: Replaying Scrub Cycle Upsets
The first fault injection method uses radiation test data to select scrub cycles that report at
least one event and injects each bit reported from the scrub cycle individually. For each injected
bit, the entire CRAM content is read to detect if additional bits have been upset as a consequence
of this single-bit upset. If the original injected bit causes additional upsets, these bits are classified
as a micro-SEFI event. In the case that no additional upsets are seen, then, the CRAM content is
restored before continuing with the next bit.
This method was tested on the LANSCE 2018 tests for the XC7A200T device. The method
detected only the presence of the 120 6-bit micro-SEFIs. Although no more micro-SEFIs were
identified, this method can be useful if used as an additional step in the MCU extraction.

Method 2: Targeting Essential Bits
The second fault injection method is design specific and targets essential CRAM bits within
a design. Essential bits are those that have some impact on the functionality of the design (most
bits are not essential). The goal is to isolate the potential bits from the essential bits file that control
a targeted resource. Repeating this process for different instances of the same resource can provide
enough information to learn the footprint of the micro-SEFI and can also reveal the bit causing the
micro-SEFI. With this information, it is possible to identify remaining micro-SEFIs that were not
identified previously from the lower set of the data, i.e., scrub cycles with fewer upsets than k.
83

To test this method, faults were injected into a synthetic design on the XC7A200T to gather
more micro-SEFI data and study their footprint. The design consists of instantiating 500 memory
LUTs (LUTRAMs) initialized to the desired value. With the essential bit file, a targeted fault
injection was performed on several designs with the 64-bit memory content set to hexadecimal
values within the range of 0x0000000000000000 and 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF. The injections were
only single-bit injections where the content of a single bit was changed at a time. In the case where
no additional upsets happened, the fault was scrubbed. In the interesting case where additional
upsets were detected, the device was reconfigured and the bit causing the event was flagged as
a micro-SEFI source bit. The results of this experiment identify the bit causing the micro-SEFI
in the LUTRAMs. Interestingly, the size of the micro-SEFI varies depending on the initialization
content of the memory LUT; this finding supports the claim that the size of a micro-SEFI is designdependent.
Table 7.2 shows the memory LUT content and the patterns read after causing a micro-SEFI
in the LUTs. The first column specifies the values in binary loaded in all nibbles of the LUT.
The second column shows the read pattern after causing the micro-SEFI in the LUTs. The pattern
specified in the second column repeats affecting two or four 32-bit words, with the number of
affected 32-bit words specified in column 3. From these experiments, it is possible to notice that
the number of bits in the micro-SEFI depends on the initial value loaded into the memory-LUT.
Also, it can be noted that the effect of the micro-SEFI has a more involved effect than simply
clearing all the bits. Without the physical layout for the implementation of these LUTs is hard to
point out what the source bit of the micro-SEFI is exactly doing.
In addition to the size, the results provide valuable information to automate the process
of detecting a memory-LUT micro-SEFI. The data suggest that an upset in a frame address with
minor2 30 or 31 consistently produces a memory-LUT micro-SEFI in the XC7A200T device.
A similar experiment was performed on the LUT memories of the XCKU040 device. The
results of this experiment showed that the patterns of the micro-SEFIs are not regular, as in the
case of the Artix 7 device. We were unable to map the number of bits in the micro-SEFI with the
number of set bits in the LUT. However, the results show that the size of the LUT micro-SEFIs can
range from 3 bits to 32 bits affecting at least two words and four at most. The results also provide
2 For

Xilinx devices, the term minor refers to the five least significant bits of a frame address.
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Table 7.2: Patterns of memory LUT micro-SEFIs.
Memory LUT micro-SEFI
Number
Initialization
Pattern
Affected Words
00002
none
none
00012
AAAA000016
2
00102
00112
AAAA000016
4
01002
5555000016
2
10002
AAAA000016
01112
4
FFFF000016
10102
FFFF000016
2
11002
5555000016
4
5555000016
11012
4
FFFF000016
11112
FFFF000016
4

information on the source bits that cause the micro-SEFI. For the XCKU040, the micro-SEFI
presented in minors 6, 7, and less frequently, appeared in minor 8.
A final experiment was performed using the b13 design [87]. To utilize a significant amount
of resources in the device, the b13 state machine was replicated 256 times for a single design. The
experiment injected each of the essential bits individually at least three times. The results showed
that additionally to the micro-SEFIs in minors 6, 7, and 8, there were some micro-SEFIs in minors
12, 24, 26, and 27. These micro-SEFIs affected two words of two different frames.
Again, it is hard to point out exactly the affected resources and the exact mechanism which
causes the micro-SEFIs without more information on the physical layout or the relationship between the resources controlled by each bit in the CRAM. The latter has been partially addressed
with project X-Ray. This project has been used to understand the relationship of each bit in the
CRAM with the resource it controls in [88]. However, project X-ray only supports a single Xilinx
FPGA family, thus, is not a scalable solution to understand micro-SEFIs.

7.3

Summary
This chapter described fault injection as a method to assess the response of FPGA designs

to single-bit upsets. The chapter discusses the setup needed to perform fault injection, as well
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as the flow used. Then, fault injection was compared to radiation testing to detail some of the
advantages and drawbacks of each method.
The chapter then showed how to use fault injection to identify more micro-SEFIs in radiation test data. This is done to identify possible micro-SEFIs that have a small size and may
be mixed with the events identified as MCUs. This approach was inspired by the results in the
LANSCE 2018 experiment that suggest the possibility of having a micro-SEFI.
The case study on the XC7A200T showed that micro-SEFIs can also be found in the radiation data filtered with Poisson statistics and used to reconstruct MCUs. Injecting each bit on all the
supposed 6-bit MCUs revealed that 120 events were micro-SEFIs and not MCUs. After filtering
these newly found micro-SEFIs the breakdown of MCUs by size showed a behavior that decreased
as the MCU size increased. This behavior is the same found in the results of Chapter 6.
Inspired by the identification of the 6-bit micro-SEFIs in the XC7A200T, two methods
that use fault injection to identify micro-SEFIs in FPGA designs were tested. The first method
consisted of performing single-bit injections with each bit on scrub cycles that reported two or
more upsets. The results identified the same 6-bit micro-SEFIs in the XC7A200T suggesting that
it is possible to identify additional micro-SEFIs with this method.
The second method used the essential bit file generated with Xilinx design tools. This file
was used to perform targeted fault injection into the bits of the file. The results showed that some
micro-SEFIs can be identified with this method too. In the case of the LUT design, micro-SEFIs
were observed for the XC7A200T device as well as for the XCKU040 device. This suggests that
performing targeted fault injection with the essential file of the design can help uncover microSEFIs in the device.
The next chapter describes a fault injection method that uses the MCUs data to assess the
response of FPGA designs. The chapter uses the data previously extracted from MCUs in Chapter
6 to generate the fault injection method that uncovers failures that only occur in the presence of
MCUs.
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CHAPTER 8.

MCU FAULT INJECTION

Radiation-induced Multiple-Cell Upsets (MCU) are events that may account for more than
50% of failures on TMR designs in SRAM FPGAs [14]. This number of failures makes MCU a
major concern for TMR-protected designs.
These failures are generally found while performing a radiation test. However, depending
on the fluence, radiation tests can take several hours to produce a single MCU failure. Especially
when the design is protected with a reliable fault-tolerant technique.
A fast and affordable method to test the MCU response of fault-tolerant designs is needed.
It is important to understand the impact of MCU events on FPGA designs to improve fault mitigation techniques. These needs can be met using an enhanced fault injection method that uses MCU
information to inject representative MCU events into an FPGA system.
This chapter describes an enhanced fault injection method for SRAM-based FPGAs that
injects multiple-cell upsets within the configuration memory of an FPGA based on multiple-cell
upset information extracted from previous radiation tests with the method described previously in
Chapter 5. The improved fault injection technique uncovers failures that could only occur when
multiple bits have been injected within the system. The results from several MCU fault injection
experiments also show that injecting MCUs can replicate the failures observed in the radiation
radiation test to identify new failure mechanisms.

8.1

MCU Fault Injection Overview
Results from the MCU extraction process can be used to generate a database of MCUs.

Table 8.1 shows an excerpt on the database used. This database is a comma-separated value (csv)
file that contains the name of the experiment, the run number, the number of scrub cycles within
the run, the frame, word, and bit location of the upset, and an indicative of MCU presence. This
last column is used to indicate that a set of bits is an MCU. If the column has a 0 that means that it
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is an SCU. If the column has another number that means that the lines with the same number are
part of an MCU.
For example, in Table 8.1 scrub cycle 397 has three upsets. One is an SCU and the other
two are part of an MCU. Scrub cycle with ID number 405 has another interesting example. In this
case, the scrub cycle reported five upsets. One of them is an SCU and the four remaining ones form
two two-bit MCUs. With the information stored in this database, it is possible to perform different
types of MCU fault injection tests.
Table 8.1: Snippet from MCU database.
Day
2018-12-08
2018-12-08
2018-12-08
2018-12-08
2018-12-08
2018-12-08
2018-12-08
2018-12-08
2018-12-08
2018-12-08
2018-12-08
2018-12-08
2018-12-08
2018-12-08
2018-12-08
2018-12-08
2018-12-08
2018-12-08

Design
split-clock
split-clock
split-clock
split-clock
split-clock
split-clock
split-clock
split-clock
split-clock
split-clock
split-clock
split-clock
split-clock
split-clock
split-clock
split-clock
split-clock
split-clock

Run
2-210128
2-210128
2-210128
2-210128
2-210128
2-210128
2-210128
2-210128
2-210128
2-210128
2-210128
2-210128
2-210128
2-210128
2-210128
2-210128
2-210128
2-210128

Scrub ID
388
388
393
393
394
397
397
397
404
405
405
405
405
405
407
407
410
410

Frame
0x00401884
0x0042211B
0x00001B1C
0x00001B1D
0x004011A3
0x00022820
0x00022821
0x0042110A
0x00400302
0x0000061D
0x00420D20
0x00420D21
0x00423416
0x00423417
0x0000169A
0x0000169B
0x00001B0D
0x00001F05

Word
52
0
23
23
26
0
0
13
34
88
87
87
61
61
57
57
43
20

Bit
27
16
30
29
7
6
7
4
7
22
13
14
15
14
7
8
18
20

MCU
0
0
1
1
0
1
1
0
0
0
1
1
2
2
1
1
0
0

For example, one test can follow the distribution of SCU and MCUs as seen in a radiation
environment or during a radiation test. This would be mean to replay the data or to follow the
percentage of SCUs and MCUs in a test. The test would then randomly pick an SCU from all the
SCUs or an MCU from all the MCUs. It could also follow the MCU distribution of sizes if desired
using data as shown previously in the MCU results (Section 6.3.1).
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Another type of test can exercise the design and monitor the response to uncover failure
modes that only occur when exposed to MCUs. This would mean ignoring all the upsets with a
value of 0 in the “MCU” column of the database. This chapter focuses on the latter.
A straightforward way to exercise the response behavior to MCUs of a given design is to
pick an MCU shape from the database generated with the extraction of MCUs using the technique
in this dissertation and inject it into the design. From this database, it is possible to pick a random
MCU and inject it into the design. Since the MCU injected was previously seen in the radiation test,
it is safe to assume that the MCU is a valid MCU that could be observed in radiation environments.
For this chapter, MCUs injected during fault injection are those that were previously seen in the
neutron beam.
Injecting MCUs presents different challenges than single-bit fault injection. To inject an
MCU successfully, the logical locations of bits to be injected must be constrained to a range of
user-accessible locations within the device CRAM. This, however, is not a problem for this work
because the MCUs injected are those extracted from neutron radiation tests.
Another challenge is that several bits need to be injected at a time. When injecting an
MCU, the smallest amount of delay possible between injections is needed to inject the bits that
compose the MCU. This is straightforward in Xilinx devices when the upsets of an MCU are in
the same frame because this can be done without any additional delay. However, if the upsets are
spread across more than one frame, then, an additional delay will be induced.
The fault injection system keeps track of all the injected bits to repair them after injection.
Similar to the normal fault injection flow, the system status is monitored while the injections occur,
and system failures are reported. The fault injection algorithm then needs to repair all injected
faults as part of the MCU to avoid the accumulation of upsets in the design.
The steps in the fault injection flow for MCUs are summarized in Fig 8.1. These steps need
to be followed when an MCU is being injected into the design. If the injection is an SCU, the flow
described in the previous chapter on Figure 7.1 must be used. The differences between the flows
are mainly in that for MCU injection the locations to inject the MCU bits must be computed and
checked to know if the location is valid. The other difference is that if an MCU span across more
than one frame, the fault injection algorithm must wait until all frames are properly changed.
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Figure 8.1: MCU Fault Injection Flow

The primary goal of all experiments described in this chapter is to quantify the design
failures that are caused by MCUs (i.e., not caused by single-bit upsets). When MCU failures are
observed during fault injection, the CRAM cells that make up the MCU are injected one at a time
to verify that the fault is caused by multiple CRAM upsets and not due to any one of the CRAM
cells by itself.

8.2

Experimental Setup
Several experiments were conducted to show the benefits of emulating MCUs during fault

injection tests. The MCU events injected during these experiments were based on radiation test
data from previous neutron radiation testing at LANSCE 2018. The MCUs used were extracted
from the CRAM upset data by following the process presented in Chapter 5.
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Figure 8.2: Multiple TURTLE Fault Injection Platform featuring two XC7A200T devices per layer.

All of the fault injection experiments were conducted on the TURTLE fault injection system [79], shown in Figure 8.2. This system uses two Xilinx XC7A200T devices – one acts as the
design under test (DUT) and the other as the golden device. The two boards are coupled with a
custom FPGA Mezzanine Card (FMC) for data comparison to detect failures in the DUT. Faults
are injected into the DUT while the golden device carefully monitors the DUT behavior. DUT
failures due to CRAM faults are reported to a host system.
The MCU fault injection was performed using the JTAG Configuration Manager (JCM)
[73]. The JCM configures both devices, injects faults into the CRAM of the DUT, compares the
output of the golden and DUT designs, reports any failures, and corrects the failure by either
scrubbing or reconfiguring the device. For these experiments, a 1 ms delay was added between
each injected MCU to allow all the 8, 000 test vectors to be evaluated. In this experiment, the delay
added by the injection of each bit in an MCU that spans across several frames was 9.05 × 10−4 s.
For these experiments, the JCM injected faults based on the MCU patterns extracted from
a neutron radiation test of the XC7A200T device at LANSCE 2017 and 2018. The collected
data from the radiation tests are divided into individual scrub cycles. These scrub cycles contain
both the logical address location of 1, 210, 370 upsets and an indication to denote if a failure was
detected in the scrub cycle. With these data, three fault injection experiments were performed on
eight different FPGA designs using the TURTLE system.
The FPGA designs used for these experiments were all based on the B13 benchmark circuit
(a simple state machine design [87]). The B13 state machine was replicated 256 times within a
91

single FPGA design to utilize a significant number of resources on the device. This base design
was then modified with various SEU mitigation techniques to create eight total design variations
for testing. These designs are:
Non-TMR The original circuit with no mitigation. techniques applied to it
Common-IO The original circuit with TMR applied to but without any of the input or output pins
being triplicated.
Split-Clock The common-io three-voter circuit with a split-clock mitigation technique applied.
Unlike the common-io design, the split-clock mitigation technique triplicates internal clock
buffers in the DUT design.
Trip-IO The original circuit with TMR applied to it, and where all the input and output pins are
triplicated.
SPF-PCMF The triplicated-io circuit with Place Common Mode Failure (PCMF) applied. The
PCMF technique alters the placement of the design to increase the reliability of the design
[89].
SPF-TMR This circuit implements both split-clock and split-io mitigation techniques. Split-io
triplicates IO buffers within the design rather than triplicating input pins to the design.
SPF-PCMF This is the SPF circuit with PCMF added for increased reliability.
Striped-TMR The trip-io circuit with striping applied. Striping is a technique that constrains each
TMR domain to separate columns within the device [14].

8.3

Experimental Results
Three experiments were performed to better understand MCU-induced design failures. In

the first experiment, single-bit and MCU fault injections were performed to categorize faults seen
in the radiation test as caused by either an SCU or an MCU. In the second experiment, all identified MCUs were injected into the most reliable designs to identify MCU design failures within the
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designs that have the most effective SEU mitigation techniques implemented. In the third experiment, MCU data observed from multiple radiation tests are combined and applied to uncover new
failure mechanisms not seen during radiation testing.

8.3.1

Experiment 1: Comparison of SBU Failures to MCU Failures
The first experiment was designed to show that some failures will only occur in a design

if multiple upsets are present in the system during operation, i.e., if an MCU has occurred. For
this experiment, single-bit upsets were injected into each of the eight designs. These bits were
the upsets recorded during a previous radiation test that is part of a scrub cycle with a failure.
The upsets were injected as single bits even if the upset was previously determined to be part of
an MCU. During fault injection, all upsets that caused a failure on the design were recorded for
further analysis. After injecting all single bit upsets, each design was injected with the previously
identified MCUs of the selected scrub cycles. The first experiment concluded by determining the
number of SCUs and MCUs that caused a failure in each design.
The first experiment shows there is an additional number of failures that can only occur in
the presence of an MCU. The results of this experiment are summarized in Table 8.2. Consider the
spf-tmr design. In this design, only eight failures were identified in the radiation test. Out of those
failures two were caused by an SCU, while the remaining six failures were produced by an MCU.
It is interesting to note that the percentage of additional failures seen during MCU fault
injection passed 100% in three of the eight designs. Not only does this translate into more total
failures, but also the additional statistics gathered could tighten the error bounds for the computation of the sensitivity of the design [90].
Two of the designs, pcm f −tmr and striped −tmr, had no failure for either single-bit fault
injections and MCU fault injection. These two designs also had the least number of failures during
radiation testing and are the two designs under test for the second experiment.

8.3.2

Experiment 2: MCU Fault Injection Failure Analysis
The second experiment performed additional MCU fault injection on the two designs from

the previous experiment with the lowest number of recorded failures during the radiation tests. This
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Table 8.2: Summary of results for single-bit and MCU fault injection for experiment 1, with only
selected MCUs injected.

non-tmr
common-io
split-clock
trip-io
spf-pcmf
spf-tmr
pcmf-tmr
striped-tmr

Failures
Single-bit MCU
893
73
50
11
29
7
4
12
4
5
2
6
0
0
0
0

Additional MCU
Failures
8.17%
22.00%
24.14%
300.00%
125.00%
300.00%
NA
NA

additional fault injection experiment was an exhaustive MCU test where all the MCUs, regardless if
identified in a scrub cycle with a failure or not, were injected. This is the difference with experiment
1, since in experiment 1 only the scrub cycles with failure were used to inject the corresponding
bits.
The goal of injecting MCUs in this experiment was to demonstrate the need to test designs
that have added SEU mitigation techniques. This experiment helps understand the behavior and
failure modes of these mitigated designs. For this experiment, over 107, 000 MCUs extracted from
the LANSCE data, corresponding to 284, 000 upsets were injected between the striped and PCMF
designs. The MCUs injected corresponded to all the MCUs that were detected for each design
during radiation tests.
Table 8.3 shows the results of the second experiment. The first column shows the number
of failures that happened on the designs during radiation testing. When injecting the extracted
MCUs, the number of failures increased for both designs. Interestingly, it was possible to add one
additional failure with the injection of all the MCUs to the “striped-tmr” design. The results also
show that the number of failures for the “pcmf-tmr” design was exceeded by 7. Since the MCUs
were injected in the same location as they appeared in the radiation test data, this experiment shows
that even replaying the data can yield tighter bounds on the sensitivity of radiation-tested designs.
This is shown in the next experiment.
A difference between neutron and fault injection results can be seen in the results. A
possible explanation for the difference in results could be that during radiation tests, faults can
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Table 8.3: Results for the second experiment.
Design
striped-tmr
pcmf-tmr

Failures
radiation test Fault Injection
37
38
2
9

Increase
in Failures
2.7%
350%

Total Upsets
450,693
98,200

occur directly after the checking of the device status or during a scrub cycle of the CRAM. The
maximum time for a fault to propagate in the radiation test is determined by the scrub cycle, which
is 0.25ms. For MCU FI, the time is 1ms plus 0.1ms for each bit in the MCU.
In contrast, the timing of the injection is controlled in fault injection. This controlled
environment ensures that every injected fault is present in the device for the duration of one entire
scrub cycle. This delay propagates the fault throughout the system and allows the failure or other
behavior to reach the output before the device status is checked.

8.3.3

Experiment 3: Reusability of MCUs from other Radiation Tests to Assess TMR Designs
This experiment injected MCUs from other radiation tests into the pcmf-tmr and striped-

tmr TMR designs. The goal was to demonstrate that MCUs extracted from other radiation tests and
MCU fault injection can be used to gather more statistics on the design failures. As noted before,
the two designs chosen for this experiment are the most robust. During all the neutron radiation
tests, pcmf only had two failures, which yielded a large error bound in the design sensitivity. Using
MCU FI can decrease those bounds and provide additional information on the failure modes of the
design.
Table 8.4 shows the results of the third experiment. The first column specifies the test
design. The second shows the number of failures during the radiation test. The third column is the
number of additional failures experienced by the design when injecting MCUs from other radiation
tests. In parenthesis, the lower and upper limits are shown for a 95% confident intervals for Poisson
statistics [64]. The fourth column has the percentage increase of additional failures. Finally, the
last column shows the number of injected MCUs. It is worth noting that this experiment is not
trying to replay the data but instead uses other MCU data comprised of valid MCU seen in other
tests to make the design fail.
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Table 8.4: Results for the third experiment.
Design
striped-tmr
pcmf-tmr

Failures
Radiation test Additional FI
37 (26.0 51.0) 9 (33.6 61.3)
2 (0.2 7.2)
47 (36.1 64.8)

Increase
in Failures
.24×
23.5×

Total MCU
20,562
87,570

Results from this experiment show that using data from other radiation tests can be beneficial to help uncover failures in robust TMR techniques. The results for the MCU FI experiments
performed in this dissertation encourage the reusability of data and demonstrates a straightforward,
low-cost fault injection approach to test SEU mitigated designs with valid MCUs. This experiment
can be performed as part of the fault injection routine before going to a radiation test or as an
alternative when a radiation test is not an option.

8.4

Summary
This chapter introduced an improved fault injection flow that considers the injection of

MCUs. This flow was tested using MCU data extracted from neutron radiation tests at LANSCE.
Three different experiments were performed to show the importance of including MCU data during
fault injection.
The first experiment showed that some failures can only happen in the presence of an MCU,
i.e., single bit injections cannot detect these failures. The second experiment used the more robust
TMR designs from the previous experiment to inject all the MCUs that were seen in the radiation
test for each of these designs. The results showed that replaying the MCU data can produce more
failures in the design than observed during the radiation tests. Finally, the last experiment showed
that using MCUs from different tests can significantly raise the number of failures and make the
error bounds tighter.
All of these experiments show the importance of using radiation data to perform fault injection. As seen in the experiments, additional statistics can be acquired without extra time in a
radiation facility. These experiments can all be performed without the need for special radiation
facilities. This makes MCU fault injection a low-cost technique that can help evaluate the MCU
response of FPGA designs.
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CHAPTER 9.

CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK

This dissertation achieved the goal of extracting MCUs from radiation test data with no
knowledge of the physical layout of the device. Using Poisson statistics to dictate the likeliness
that a single particle produced several upsets in the CRAM and BRAM of an FPGA device.
Moreover, the method used in this dissertation allowed the isolation of micro-SEFIs and
MCUs for an in-depth examination. Once such events are found, the information of the location
is recorded so that engineers could study a particular effect on their design. With this information,
engineers will also be able to develop strategies to mitigate the effects of a micro-SEFI or MCU.
In addition to extracting MCUs and micro-SEFIs, this work shows an enhanced fault injection method. This method gives additional insights into the failures of a design when compared
to traditional single-bit fault injection. This enables engineers and designers to test their FPGA
designs in a controlled environment, facilitating assessing TMR flavors before radiation testing.
Experiments have shown that MCUs are of concern for ECC-protected devices and triplicated designs in FPGAs. This work shows a statistical technique that successfully extracts MCUs
from radiation testing data. The method reduces the contamination of the data by identifying
micro-SEFIs, providing more accurate identification of MCUs. Applying this method to radiation
tests enables the use of the extracted information to generate improved fault injection campaigns
where MCUs could be injected either based on their distribution or at an accelerated pace. Moreover, researchers will have the option to control the size, shape, and frequency of the injected
MCU.
In addition, the technique presented in this work identified MCUs and micro-SEFIs from radiation data on three different FPGA families: 7-series (28nm), UltraScale (20nm), and UltraScale+
(16nm). The technique used statistics to compute the cut-off value to divide the Poisson distribution into two sets. The resulting upper set isolates possible micro-SEFI events. For the lower set
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of data, the use of fault injection provides information to distinguish between MCUs and microSEFIs.
Performing fault injection in the devices revealed additional information about microSEFIs. The experiment on the memory LUTs uncovered the specific bits causing a LUT microSEFI for the XC7A200T and XCKU040 devices. Additionally, the experiment on the b13 design
showed that micro-SEFIs are not always reproducible for two main reasons. First, a micro-SEFI
event could be triggered during a radiation test when a particle upsets a bit that is not user accessible for fault injection testing. Second, injecting a specific bit may not always trigger the
micro-SEFI event in the design. The inconsistency of reproducing micro-SEFI events during fault
injection requires further research to understand what causes this behavior.
The overall results show that micro-SEFIs are rare events that have a small cross-section.
However, they can harm FPGA TMR designs. Micro-SEFIs can overcome protection techniques
like SECDED, as shown by the BRAM results where two bits in each word got corrupted making
the BRAM data unusable. This behavior drove the experiment of generating a synthetic design to
investigate the footprint of micro-SEFIs. Results from performing essential bit fault injection show
that some micro-SEFIs can be mapped to a specific bit within the CRAM. To further increase the
understanding of micro-SEFIs it is possible to use projects like Project X-Ray [91].
Chapter 8 shows an enhanced Fault Injection testing method that includes MCUs for the
injections. Using MCUs during fault injection helps uncover possible unwanted behaviors of a design. Additionally, it helps to produce failures on designs protected with robust fault-tolerant techniques. Furthermore, injecting MCUs provides an alternative method to test designs for projects
when access to a radiation test facility may not be possible.
The results for the first experiment on the MCU fault injection method show that MCUs
cause additional failures that cannot be replicated with the injection of a single bit. For the designs
tested, this resulted in 3× more failures. For a second experiment, the proposed fault injection
method produced, for one of the designs, more than 3× more failures. This result is interesting
because even without moving the location of the extracted MCUs, or without generating MCUs,
it is possible to induce more failures in the design than the ones experienced in a radiation test.
This insight shows the importance of at least replaying the radiation test results. Finally, for both
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experiments, having additional failures translates into tighter bounds for the computation of the
device cross-section.
The method to extract MCUs and micro-SEFIs can be used after performing a radiation
test on an FPGA design. The MCU and micro-SEFI data can be correlated with the failures that
happened during the test. This would give designers additional insight into possible vulnerable elements in the tested design. With this information, designers can prepare different TMR approaches
- or mitigation techniques - that may improve the previous design.
After preparing different protected designs, the designs would need to be evaluated. At this
point, MCU FI becomes beneficial to assess the new designs. With the extracted MCU information
and the MCU FI method proposed in this dissertation, it is possible to reuse radiation data to test
the response of a design to SCUs and MCUs. Incorporating MCU FI in the evaluation phase of
designs can give insight into which of all the prepared designs is worth testing in a radiation test.

9.1

Future Work
For future work, the MCU extraction can be improved considering that the distribution of

the size of MCUs follows a Poisson distribution. With this, it would be possible to iterate through
the extracted MCUs and break them down into smaller sizes to generate a more accurate Poisson
fit of the events.
Likewise, fitting the MCU sizes to a Poisson distribution could help reduce the difference
seen between a long scrub cycle and a short scrub cycle when extracting MCUs. An examination
of the results for the same device in experiments at LANSCE 2016 (D.3 and LANSCE 2018 (D.4)
show a difference between the percentage of MCUs to SCUs. More MCUs are extracted in the
case of the LANSCE 2016 data, which has a scrub cycle 16 times slower. Also, the percentage of
2-bit MCUs is higher in LANSCE 2018 data. These findings suggest that a Poisson fit could break
larger MCUs on data with long scrub cycles.
Furthermore, the fault injection method based on extracting MCUs and micro-SEFIs can
be used to achieve the goal of modeling real-world radiation environments. For this goal, it is
necessary to adjust the MCU shapes and locations based on the fluence distribution of the radiation
environment. Then, the following step is to explore generating new shapes based on the extracted
patterns of the radiation test. Finally, combine these data with the constraining of MCU shapes
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to create a fault injection technique capable of producing results that more closely mimic ones
expected during exposure to a radiation environment.
Future work can also extend in mapping micro-SEFIs to a specific resource. It is possible
to follow the approach described to encounter the memory LUT micro-SEFI. Also, micro-SEFIs
could be tied to their resource using a project like X-Ray, where the role of each bit in the bitstream
is exposed.
Although this work uses MCUs previously seen in the neutron radiation test, it is possible
to inject MCUs from the database in other locations. However, this involves additional challenges,
given that MCUs are related to the physical layout of the device. First, it might not be possible to
inject the desired MCU shape in the desired location. This obstacle could happen due to an invalid
logical bit location that restricts the user from accessing the bit. Second, even though the user
can attempt to inject any MCU shape in random bits of the device, this could violate the nature of
MCUs. Potentially, the selected bits may not be physically close to each other. To overcome these
challenges, it is necessary to perform statistical analysis on the locations of the MCUs and restrict
the valid location to inject an MCU.
In addition to injecting extracted MCUs in a different location, another interesting improvement is to generalize MCUs to reuse data across different devices. To achieve this goal it is
important to understand as much as possible the location where MCUs happen and the resources
that these MCUs affect. Even if the resource cannot be mapped, it is possible to breakdown the
location of MCUs based on the frame address. With the frame address it is possible to understand,
to some extent, in what columns of logic in the FPGA MCUs are. Extracting patterns based on the
frame can be a first step to migrate MCUs between devices of the same family.
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APPENDIX A.

PUBLICATIONS

The results from this work have led to the following publications:
• [92] - This paper describes an enhanced fault injection method for SRAM-based FPGAs that
uses multiple-cell upset information from radiation tests to uncover failures that single-bit
fault injection cannot cause.
• [76] - This paper presents a method to identify micro-single event functional interrupts from
beam-test data in the configuration memory and BRAM of SRAM-based FPGAs. The results
show the cross-section of these events for three SRAM FPGAs.
• [13] - This article presents a statistical method to extract MCU shapes and frequencies from
components with no information regarding their physical layout. The proposed method can
be used to extract MCU information from BRAM and CRAM alike. The results show the
MCU data for three families of Xilinx field-programmable gate arrays.
• [63] - This work presents the characterization of a FinFET Xilinx UltraScale+ device with
heavy ion and neutron irradiation. The work shows SEU cross-sections and the performance
of the part. My contribution was the MCU analysis for heavy-ion data. The MCU results
showed an excellent response of the device with roughly 7% of those events.
• [93] - This work presents the results of a dynamic testing campaign on Virtex 7. The work
comprises features such as IO blocks, IOSERDES, phase-locked loop clocks, and BRAMs.
For this paper, I worked in the BRAM section. I provided an analysis that helped uncovered
a micro-SEFI called column clobber. In this event, one or two columns of the BRAM change
their content. This is seen as a 512 or 1024 upset event.
• [14] - This paper explores removing common-mode failures from TMR designs on FPGAs.
My contribution was on the MCU analysis of millions of upsets. The analysis revealed that
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there is no difference in the MCU response for neutron tests performed at different locations.
The MCU data provided was used to replicate the failures, the results showed that MCUs
have a high contribution to the failure of designs protected with TMR. Lastly, the MCU
analysis showed that approximately 30% of events are MCUs.
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APPENDIX B.

RELIABILITY OVERVIEW

This appendix discusses reliability concepts that are used in this dissertation.
Fault Mitigation Techniques are implemented to increase the reliability of the system. The
reliability R(t) is the probability that a device operates correctly under certain conditions during
the interval of time (t0 ,t), considering that it was working properly at time t0 . ’Working correctly’
means that no failure –end of the ability to perform a required task–should be presented [25].
Consider a test on N components, statistically equals, at time t0 and registering the number
of components that failed and the number of components that worked correctly at time t. The
number of components that failed in time t are N f (t) and the number of components that remain
working correctly are No (t). The reliability of the component in time t is shown in equation B.1;
which is the probability that a component survives to the interval [to ,t]. The expression assumes
that if a component fails it will stay that way.

R(t) =

No (t)
No (t)
=
N
No (t) + N f (t)

(B.1)

The probability that a component does not survive in the interval [to ,t] is called unreliability
Q(t). The expression of the unreliability is shown in equation B.2.

Q(t) =

N f (t)
N f (t)
=
N
No (t) + N f (t)

(B.2)

For any given time t, R(t) = 1.0 − Q(t).
The reliability can be written as a differentiation of R(t) with time, as shown in equation
B.3. The derivate of N f with time represents the failure rate of a component. In time t there are No
components working correctly. Dividing the instantaneous failure rate by No (t), results in equation
B.4 which represents the failure rate. The failure rate is measured in faults per time unit.
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dN f (t)
dR(t)
= (−N)
dt
dt

z(t) =

1 dN f (t)
No (t) dt

(B.3)

(B.4)

If the assumption that the failure rate is constant is made and has a value of λ , the solution
to the differential equation is shown in equation B.5.
R(t) = e−λt

(B.5)

Where λ is the constant failure rate.
The exponential relation between the reliability and time is known as exponential law of
failures [94]; which states that for a constant failure rate the reliability changes exponentially with
time.
The law is successfully used in the analysis of electric components. Moreover, the exponential model is related with Poisson, which allows expressing the probability P(t, n) that in an
interval (0,t) i events will occur.

112

APPENDIX C.

RADIATION INTERACTION WITH ELECTRONIC DEVICES

Three concepts have been widely adopted by the radiation community to describe the radiation environment and the interaction with electronic devices. These concepts are flux, fluence, and
cross sections. These three concepts are vital to assess the behavior of FPGA devices in radiation
environments.
Figure C.1 shows the interaction between the incident radiation in a unitary area a on a
surface S. Given a time t, the number of particles p that crosses the unitary area will characterize
the target. Each particle of the beam can have a different incident angle α when crossing the
surface.

Figure C.1: Flux on a target area [3].
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The flux is the number of particles p that crossed the area a on a unit of time t. The flux is
measured in [#particles/cm2 s].
The particle fluence Φ is the integral of the flux in time. The fluence describes the number
of particles that crossed the section during a particular time. Fluence is measured in [#particles/cm2 ].
Finally, the cross section σ is a hypothetical measure that represents the device sensitivity
accurately. Such that if a particle crosses the target area, there will be an effect in the device. The
cross section is measured in [cm2 ]. The cross section is an important aspect for characterizing
electronic devices for different particles. In this work the cross section determined by experiments
was mostly the neutron cross section but the wotk also includes data for heavy-ion and proton
testing.
The physical effects due to the impact of radiation on the materials used for electronic
devices are phenomena too complex to model. Consider the phenomena depicted in Figure C.2
where a primary particle strikes a material and penetrates with a scattering path. The path is random
and determined by the collision of the particle with the core of the material. Even though, the path
can be approximated to a linear path, the effect of the loss of charge, the secondary particles, and
stopping power makes the phenomena not practical to model for electronic devices.

Figure C.2: Particle actual path [3].
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Simulation of the physical effect becomes extremely complex and time consuming. Fortunately, common behaviors have been identified within the affected devices. The behaviors are
related to the circuit functionality instead of the physical principles of the technology, becoming
more comprehensive for the user. Based on the need of a comprehensive model, the fault model
was introduced [3].
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APPENDIX D.

MCU DATA

This appendix shows the results after applying the proposed technique to the tests listed
in Table D.1. The results specify the percentage of MCUs presented during each of the radiation
tests. Likewise, these results show the MCU-size distribution.
The code developed can be downloaded from: https://github.com/byuccl/MCU_Analysis.
Table D.1: List of radiation tests used to extract MCUs with the proposed technique.
Facility
LANSCE
LANSCE
LANSCE
LANSCE
CHIPIR
TRIUMF
LANSCE
LANSCE
LANSCE
CHIPIR

Year
2016
2018
2018
2018
2018
2018
2019
2019
2019
2019

Device
XC7A200T
XC7A200T
XCKU040
XCZU9EG
XCKU040
XC7V980T
XC7K325T
XCKU040
XCKU9P
XCZU9EG

Total Upsets
77,097
65,935
61,249
3,971
59,484
193,792
166,224
84,686
12,167
675

Table D.2: SCUs and MCUs from LANSCE 2016 experiment.
Device
XC7A200T

Total Upsets
77097

SCUs
34425

MCUs
42672 (55.34%)

Table D.3: MCU distribution from LANSCE 2016 experiment.
Device
XC7A200T

MCU-2
67.53%

MCU-3
12.09%
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MCU-4
10.04%

MCU-5
3.66%

MCU-6+
6.68%

Table D.4: Number of MCUs and SCUs found in LANSCE 2018 experiments.
Device
XC7A200T
XCKU040
XCZU9EG

Total Upsets
65, 935
61, 249
3, 971

SCUs
30, 186
44, 649
3, 508

MCUs
11, 567 (27.70%)
7, 628 (14.59%)
208 (5.59%)

Table D.5: Breakdown of MCUs by their size for LANSCE 2018 experiments.
Device
XC7A200T
XCKU040
XCZU9EG

MCU-2
78.53
92.61
85.10

MCU-3
6.88
3.80
10.58

MCU-4
6.66
2.37
2.40

MCU-5
2.16
0.60
0.96

MCU-6
3.19
0.17
0.48

MCU-7+
2.58
0.44
0.48

Table D.6: Number of MCUs and SCUs found in CHIPIR 2018 experiment.
Device
XCKU040

Total Upsets
59484

SCUs
39454

MCUs
9184 (18.88%)

Table D.7: Breakdown of MCUs by their size for CHIPIR 2018 experiment.
Device
XCKU040

MCU 2
91.96%

MCU 3
3.72%

MCU 4
2.96%

MCU 5
0.60%

MCU 6
0.33%

MCU 7+
0.42%

Table D.8: SCUs and MCUs from TRIUMF 2018 experiment.
Device
XC7V980T

Total Upsets
193,792

SCUs
90,785

MCUs
41,185 (53%)

Table D.9: MCU distribution from TRIUMF 2018 experiment.
Device
XC7V908T

MCU-2
78.00%

MCU-3
9.40%

MCU-4
7.80%

MCU-5
0.49%

MCU-6+
4.31%

Table D.10: Number of MCUs and SCUs found in LANSCE 2019 experiments.
Device
XC7K325T
XCKU040
XCKU9P

Total Upsets
166224
84686
12167

SCUs
77259
65847
10571

MCUs
31333 (28.85%)
8812 (11.80%)
719(6.36%)

Table D.11: Breakdown of MCUs by their size for LANSCE 2019 experiments.
Device
XC7K325T
XCKU040
XCKU9P

MCU 2
69.55%
92.13%
87.07%

MCU 3
5.57%
3.65%
8.07%

MCU 4
14.24%
3.18%
2.78%
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MCU 5
2.27%
0.46%
1.39%

MCU 6
3.81%
0.20%
0.20%

MCU 7+
4.56%
0.37%
0.50%

Table D.12: SCUs and MCUs from CHIPIR 2019 experiment.
Device
XCZU9EG

Total Upsets
675

SCUs
512

MCUs
71 (10.52%)

Table D.13: MCU distribution from CHIPIR 2019 experiment.
Device
XCZU9EG

MCU 2
77.46%

MCU 3
18.31%
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MCU 4
1.41%

MCU 5
2.82%

